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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20060477-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a State's appeal from an order dismissing, with prejudice, charges of 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, an enhanced first degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) & 58-37-8(4)(a) (West 2004), 
interference with an arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-8-305 (West 2004), and intoxication, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-701(1) (West 2004). 
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Does the Fourth Amendment require police to inform an arrestee that he is 
under arrest before taking him into custody? 
2. Did police have probable cause to believe defendant was intoxicated where 
he was stumbling around and unsteady on his feet, had glassy eyes and slurred 
speech, was belligerent and uncooperative, and smelled strongly of alcohol? 
Standard of review. An appellate court reviews for clear error the factual findings 
underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. 
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f^ 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions, 
including constitutional questions, are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, 
including its application of the legal standards to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 
11, 103 P.3d 699; see also State v. Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269, \ 7, 555 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 
5 (citing Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 25, 100 P.3d 1177). 
Preservation. These arguments were preserved by defendant's motion to suppress, 
the State's response, the parties' oral arguments, and the trial court's ruling. See R26-27, 
19-25, 39-45, 51-52, 68-71, 90-92. Copies of the pleadings are included in addendum A-
D, while copies of the transcripts are included in addendum E-G. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, an enhanced first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iii) & 58-37-8(4)(a) (West 2004), interference with an arresting officer, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (West 2004), and intoxication, 
a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-701(1) (West 2004). 
Rl-2. 
Motion to suppress granted. Defendant moved to suppress the warrantless 
seizure of cocaine from his person, asserting that police lacked probable cause to arrest 
him for intoxication. R21-25. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted 
the motion, ruling that the "Fourth Amendment requires an officer to inform an individual 
that they are under arrest," and that because police here failed to so inform defendant, the 
cocaine must be suppressed. R70-71. 
Dismissal with prejudice. The trial court dismissed the information, with 
prejudice, on 3 May 2006. R67. 
Timely notice of appeal. The State filed a timely notice of appeal on 15 May 
2006. R74. 
Transfer order. The Utah Supreme Court transferred jurisdiction of the appeal to 
this Court on 31 May 2006. R.77. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The trial court found the following uncontested facts regarding the warrantless 
seizure of cocaine from defendant's hand: 
L On November 27, 2005, Officer Jamie Boots was dispatched 
to 3204 Lincoln Avenue[, Ogden, Utah,] on a complaint of a 
fight. Officers Draper and Eggerman were also dispatched to 
the area.1 
2. Upon arrival, the officers did not initially see any individuals in the 
area. 
3. Officer Boots heard a noise he later associated to be the Defendant 
stumbling in the back parking lot of the address in question and 
observed that the Defendant was walking toward 32nd street with his 
hands in his pockets.2 
4. Officers approached the Defendant and observed that he had both 
hands inside the front pockets of his sweatshirt. 
5. Officers asked him if he had any knowledge of the fight in the area. 
6- The Defendant replied that he "didn't do shit." 
7. Officer Boots believed that the Defendant was intoxicated due to the 
Defendant's glassy eyes, slurred speech, unsteadiness on his feet, 
and the strong smell of alcohol coming from his person. 
8. Officer Boots observed the Defendant's hand was fumbling with 
something in the pocket. 
]The officers arrived at 1:54 a.m. R90:7, see addendum E. 
2Officer Boots described the noise as "kind of a like a bang." R90:7. In Officer 
Boots' experience, 32nd Street is one of the busiest streets in the area at night, as well as a 
"high crime" vicinity. R90:9, 16, 27. 
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9. Officer Boots asked the Defendant if he wouldn't mind taking his 
hands out of his pockets. 
10. The Defendant removed his left hand only to show he had nothing in 
his hand, but he never removed his right hand. 
11. Due to officer safety concerns, Officer Boots repeatedly requested 
that the Defendant removes his hands from his pockets. During 
these repeated requests, the Defendant continued to fidget with 
something in his right pocket. 
12. Officer Boots then stated to the Defendant that he was no longer 
asking the Defendant to take his hands out of his pockets, but was 
telling him to do so. 
13. At this time the Defendant turned away from the officers and began 
to walk away.3 
14. Officer Boots told the Defendant to stop and again told him to take 
his hands out of his pockets. 
15. The Defendant had only gone a few feet when Officer Boots was 
able to grab the Defendant by his left arm. 
16. Because the Defendant physically resisted Officer Boots's efforts to 
remove his right hand from his pocket, Officer Boots put the 
Defendant in a twist lock and took the Defendant to the ground. 
17. Officer Boots continued to try to get the Defendant's right hand out 
of his pocket and behind his back. 
18. Officer Eggerman and Draper also assisted Officer Boots in trying to 
removed the Defendant's hand from his pocket. During this time the 
Defendant continued to struggle against the officers. 
3Officer Boots had previously encountered similar conduct by persons carrying 
concealed weapons. R90:12. 
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19. Officer Boots then exerted two closed fist punches to the small of the 
Defendant's back in an attempt to gain control of the Defendant. 
20. Officers Boots, Draper, and Eggerman finally gained control over 
the Defendant's right hand and placed it behind his back, placing the 
Defendant in handcuffs. 
21. While placing the Defendant's hands in cuffs, Officer Boots noticed 
a clear plastic baggie containing a white rock substance gripped in 
the Defendant's right hand. 
22. At no time during the incident did Officer Boots or any other officer 
present inform the Defendant he was under arrest for public 
intoxication or for interfering with arrest.4 
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that "Officer Boots had 
reasonable articulable suspicion to perform a weapons frisk on the Defendant for officer 
safety," but lacked "probable cause to escalate the weapons frisk to a search for 
weapons." R70-71. The trial court further concluded that "[b]ecause Officer Boots did 
not inform defendant that he was under arrest" before taking him into custody, the officer 
"violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights," and "the subsequent discovery of 
[cocaine was] fruit of the poisonous tree [that must be] suppressed." Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the Fourth Amendment does not 
require police to inform arrestees of charges, or that they are under arrest. Rather, the 
4When the trial court asked if he had spoken the "magic words that [defendant] 
was under arrest," Officer Boots testified that he informed defendant of the charges after 
placing him in the squad car. R90:28. 
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only Fourth Amendment requirement for arrest, or a search incident to arrest, is probable 
cause. Thus, assuming there was probable cause to arrest defendant for intoxication, the 
trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that defendant's arrest violated the 
Fourth Amendment merely because police did not inform him that he was under arrest 
prior to seizing the cocaine in his hand. 
Point IL Police here had probable cause to arrest for intoxication. Indeed, as 
found by the trial court, defendant exhibited classic signs of intoxication when police 
encountered him in the parking lot. He was stumbling around and unsteady on his feet, 
his eyes were glassy, his speech was slurred, his tone was belligerent, his manner was 
uncooperative, and he smelled strongly of alcohol. Given these facts, defendant's arrest 
and the incident search yielding cocaine was justified. The trial court thus erred as a 
matter of law in suppressing the drug evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE POLICE TO 
INFORM AN ARRESTEE THAT HE IS UNDER ARREST BEFORE 
TAKING HIM INTO CUSTODY 
The trial court ruled that although Officer Boots properly initiated a Terry, or 
weapons frisk of defendant, police improperly escalated the frisk to an arrest without 
speaking the "magic words that [defendant] was under arrest."5 R90:28; see also R91:2, 
5See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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R92:3-4; R70-7L According to the trial court, "those words are magical, and it changes 
the status of a particular defendant in a particular situation." R91:2. The trial court thus 
concluded that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the warrantless 
seizure of the cocaine from his hand. R71. The trial court's erroneous ruling should be 
overturned. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the Fourth Amendment does not require 
police to notify arrestees of charges, let alone that they are under arrest. See Devenpeck 
v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004). Indeed, where probable cause is present police may 
search an arrestee even before performing the formality of arrest.6 See Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
The trial court erred at the outset in failing to recognize that the seizure of cocaine 
from defendant's hand was justified as incident to his arrest for intoxication, regardless of 
whether police first told defendant that he was under arrest. As recently recognized by 
the United States Supreme Court in Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004), 
probable cause is the only prerequisite to a valid arrest—or a search incident to arrest—as 
here. 
At issue in Devenpeck was the legality of an arrest where the offense for which 
there was probable to arrest was not "closely related" to the offense actually stated by the 
arresting officer at the time of arrest. Id. at 148. Specifically, Washington state police 
6The trial court's erroneous conclusion that police lacked probable cause to arrest 
or search defendant is addressed in Point II, infra. 
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officers Haner and Devenpeck arrested Alford for tape recording a traffic stop. Id. at 15 L 
Although Officer Devenpeck told Alford that he was under arrest for violating the 
Washington Privacy Act, police had probable cause to arrest Alford for impersonating 
and obstructing law enforcement officers, crimes for which Alford was neither arrested 
nor charged. Id, at 148-50. When the privacy act violation was subsequently dismissed 
on the ground that a state court decision had "clearly established that Alford's taping of 
the officers was not a crime/' Alford brought an unsuccessful § 1983 action against 
Officers Haner and Devenpeck. Id. at 151. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict in favor of the 
officers, holding that Alford was arrested without probable cause because the officers 
cited only the privacy act charge and tape recording officers conducting a traffic stop was 
not a crime. Id. at 152 (citation 'and quotation omitted). The Ninth Circuit rejected the 
officers' claim that probable cause nonetheless existed to arrest Alford for impersonating 
and obstructing law enforcement officers on the ground that these offenses "were not 
'closely related'" to the privacy act offense "invoked by Devenpeck as he took [Alford] 
into custody." Id. 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and rejected the "closely 
related" offense concept relied upon by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 153. Rather than adopt 
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, the Supreme Court held that "a warrantless arrest by a law 
officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to 
9 
believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed," regardless of whether 
police correctly communicate the offense to the arrestee. Id. at 152 (citations omitted). 
Although the Supreme Court agreed that it was "assuredly good police practice" to inform 
arrestees of the grounds for their arrest, the Court emphasized that it had "never held that 
to be constitutionally required." Id. at 155. Otherwise, legitimate arrests made by officers 
stating erroneous grounds, or "without stating the grounds," would be invalidated, which 
is just the type of "haphazard" and arbitrary result the Supreme Court had "consistently 
rejected." Id. at 156 ("We have consistently rejected a conception of the Fourth 
Amendment that would produce such haphazard results"); see also id. at 154 ("We see no 
reason to ascribe to the Fourth Amendment such arbitrarily variable protection"). Finally, 
the Supreme Court noted that arrestees who are not informed of charges "will not be left 
to wonder for long," as they must be brought before a "neutral magistrate for a judicial 
determination of probable cause." Id. at 155, n.3 (citation and quotation omitted).7 
Based on the above, the trial court's ruling, that "[t]he Fourth Amendment requires 
an officer to inform an individual that they are under arrest," R71, cannot be reconciled 
with Devenpeck and should thus be overturned. Under Devenpeck, an arrest is 
7Although the Fourth Amendment does not require police to notify arrestees of 
their "intention, cause, and authority to arrest," this duty is imposed on Utah law 
enforcement by UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-6(1) (West 2004), unless, as here, it would be 
dangerous to do so, the arrestee is engaged in the commission or attempt to commit an 
offense, or the arrestee is "pursued immediately after the commission of an offense or an 
escape." 
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reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as it is made with probable cause. No 
more is required. Thus, if police here had probable cause to arrest defendant for 
intoxication prior to effecting the arrest and seizing the cocaine from his hand, the seizure 
was justified and the trial court erred as a matter of law in suppressing the drug evidence. 
POINT II 
POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE DEFENDANT 
WAS INTOXICATED WHERE HE WAS STUMBLING AROUND 
AND UNSTEADY ON HIS FEET, HAD GLASSY EYES AND 
SLURRED SPEECH, WAS BELLIGERENT AND 
UNCOOPERATIVE, AND SMELLED STRONGLY OF ALCOHOL 
Despite entering factual findings that demonstrated probable cause to believe that 
defendant was intoxicated, the trial court ruled that police lacked probable cause to 
search. See R70-71. The trial court's ruling is not only inconsistent with its underlying 
factual findings, it is erroneous as a matter of law and should be overturned. See State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, \ 11, 103 P.3d 699 (holding trial court's legal conclusions are 
reviewed non-deferentially, for correctness). 
Whether probable cause to arrest exists in a given case depends upon "the 
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the 
time of arrest." Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152. It is an objective test, dependant upon 
whether the known facts and inferences would justify "a reasonable and prudent person" 
in believing "that the suspect had committed the offense." State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, \ 
27, 57 P.3d 1052 (quoting State v. Cole, 61A P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983)). "A law 
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enforcement officer has probable cause whenever the crime is committed in the presence 
of that officer because the observing officer knows of sufficient facts to believe that the 
suspect committed the crime alleged." Id. at % 28. Moreover, where an arrest is justified 
by probable cause, a search incident to arrest is also justified. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 
U.S. 98, 111 (1980). It is insignificant whether the search precedes the arrest, so long as 
the "formal arrest follow[s] quickly" thereafter. Id; see also In re K.K.C., 636 P.2d 
1044, 1046 (Utah 1981) ("[e]ven if the search was conducted immediately before the 
formal arrest, this would not invalidate the search nor preclude its characterization as 
being incident to arrest since the two events were substantially contemporaneous, and 
probable cause for the arrest existed independent of evidence obtained from the search"). 
Here, police had probable cause to arrest defendant for public intoxication. A 
person commits the crime of public intoxication when that person "is under the influence 
of alcohol... to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a public 
place or in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other persons." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-9-701(1) (West 2004). The trial court's factual findings establish these 
elements. 
As found by the trial court, police responded to a report of a fight and found 
defendant alone at the scene at approximately 1:54 a.m. R68; see also R90:7. Upon 
arriving, Officer Boots heard defendant "stumbling" and banging around in the "parking 
lot of the address in question." R68; see also R90:7. As Officer Boots approached, 
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"defendant was walking toward 32nd Street with his hand in his pockets." R68; see also 
R90:16 ("During the nighttime, [32nd Street is] one of the busiest streets in that area"). 
When asked if he knew anything of the reported fight, defendant replied, "Man, I didn't 
do shit." R90:9; see also R69. In addition to his belligerent attitude, defendant exhibited 
classic signs of intoxication, including, "glassy eyes, slurred speech, usteadiness on his 
feet, and the strong smell of alcohol coming from his person." R69. Defendant was also 
uncooperative, refusing to remove his right hand from his pocket after repeated requests 
to do so. Id. When Officer Boots insisted that defendant remove his right hand from his 
pocket, defendant "turned away from the Officer and began to walk away." Id. 
Concerned that defendant may be concealing a weapon, see id.; see also R90:12, Officer 
Boots grabbed him and took him to the ground. R69-70. When police finally "gained 
control over [defendant's right hand and place[d] it behind his back[] in handcuffs," 
Officer Boots noticed that defendant was gripping a clear plastic baggie containing 
cocaine. R70. 
Based on the above, Officer Boots had probable cause to believe that defendant 
"was under the influence of alcohol... to a degree that he may have endanger himself or 
another." Section 76-9-701(1). Specifically, the hour was late, the area was known for 
criminal activity, 32nd Street was busy, and the signs of defendant's 
intoxication—swaying, slurred speech, glassy eyes, and a belligerent and uncooperative 
attitude—were unmistakable. Given these circumstances, including defendant's 
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unsteadiness, Officer Boots was reasonably concerned that defendant may stumble into 
oncoming traffic, or, given defendant's obvious inebriation and surliness, that he may 
initiate or otherwise become entangled in a fight or other crime. Therefore, defendant's 
arrest for public intoxication, and search incident thereto, was justified. See section 76-9-
701(1); see also Trane, 2002 UT 97, ffl[ 37-40 (upholding Trane's arrest for public 
intoxication based on signs of Trane's physical impairment and belligerent behavior). 
The seizure of cocaine incident to defendant's arrest for intoxication thus did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment and the trial court erred as a matter of law in suppressing the drug 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's ruling suppressing the cocaine evidence should be overturned. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on _/£ August 2006. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
/Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on /g^August 2006, two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT, was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
RYAN BUSHELL 
298 24th Street, Suite 230 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
BERNARD L. ALLEN #0039 of 
Box Elder County Public Defender's Association 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2550 Washington Boulevard, Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
SECOND CliSlRICl CUURf 
mm n P 2--02 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
JAN 1 2 2006 
Case No. .051905998 
Judge W. Brent West 
COMES NOW, the Defendant above-named, by and through his attorney, 
Bernard L. Allen, and hereby moves this Court to suppress the evidence obtained in this 
matter. This Motion is based upon the Fourth Amendment the United States Constitution 
and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution and is supported by the 
attached memorandum. 
DATED t h i s / / j day of January 2006. 
L. ALLEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Motion to Suppress to: 
2380 Washington Blvd., 2nd Floor 
Weber County Attorney 
t ] 
Ogden,UT 84401 
postage prepaid, on this '_ day of January 2006. 
H'COMDDlSIRfC] QMU 
BERNARD L. ALLEN #0039 of 
Weber County Public Defender's Association 2§§!» j,4H 1 ? P 2- 0 3 
Attorney for Defendant 
2550 Washington Boulevard, Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)399-4191 
TN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH M X 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, . ] 
Defendant. ] 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
) Case No. .051905998 
Judge W. Brent West 
COMES NOW, the Defendant above-named, by and through his attorney, Bernard L. 
Allen and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Suppress. 
FACTS 
The Defendant has been charged by Information with possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute, a first degree felony, interference with arresting officer, 
a class B misdemeanor, and Intoxication a class C misdemeanor. The facts that led to the 
Defendant's arrest and subsequent search are in dispute. However, according to Officer 
Derek Draper and Officer Jamie Boots of the Ogden Police Department a complainant called 
and stated several people were fighting in front of Jessie's Barber Shop at 3204 Lincoln 
Avenue. 
When the officers arrived they didn't find anyone in front of the barbershop. They did 
find the Defendant in the back parking lot of the barbershop. According to Officer Boots, the 
Defendant was "stumbling around" in the back parking lot. No apparent injuries were 
observed nor was there any other indication that Defendant had been involved in a physical 
confrontation. Officer Boots approached the Defendant and asked him if he had any 
knowledge of the disturbance. Defendant's allegedly answered "Man, I didn't do shit." 
Officers Boots and Draper indicated that they could smell a strong odor of alcohol on 
Defendant's breath. Officer Boots indicated in his report that Defendant's eyes were 
bloodshot, his speech was slurred and he was having a hard time keeping his balance. 
Defendant was ordered to take his hands out of his pockets so he could be arrested for 
public intoxication. The Defendant turned and began to walk away. Officer Boots grabbed 
the Defendant's left arm and placed it in a twist lock. The Defendant allegedly tried to turn 
and pull away from Officer Boots grasp. 
The Defendant was taken to the ground and laid on his stomach. The Defendant 
allegedly put his right hand under his stomach. Officer Boots punched Defendant in the back 
twice. Officer Draper kneed the Defendant twice in his thigh. 
The Defendant was eventually handcuffed. Following his arrest he was searched and 
a plastic baggie containing a substance that tested positive for cocaine was found in his 
possession. 
The officers did not ask the Defendant to perform field sobriety tests or to submit to a 
Breathalyzer to determine his blood alcohol level or his level of intoxication. 
ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as Article 1 
Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provide in relevant part: "The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
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and seizures shall not be violated." The Courts on both the state and federal level have defined 
when a seizure is unreasonable. 
In State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002) the Utah Supreme Court defined its 
long-standing position on permissible levels of seizures. In Hansen, the Court defined these 
levels as follows: 
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a consensual 
encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning 
by an officer. Since the encounter is consensual, and the person is free to leave 
at any point, there is no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is usually 
characterized as brief and non-intrusive. Although it is a Fourth Amendment 
seizure, probable cause is not required. Rather, when "specific and articulable 
facts and rational inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person 
has or is committing a crime," an officer may initiate an investigative detention 
without consent. 
A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been "characterized [as 
a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] requires probable cause." A 
level three encounter is also a Fourth Amendment seizure. Id (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
The Defendant's encounter with the police officers quickly escalated to a level three 
encounter once the officers decided to arrest the Defendant. The search incident to arrest was 
a continuation of that level three encounter. Under both federal and state constitutional law, 
the police must have "probable cause" that an offense occurred. The United States Supreme 
Court has defined probable cause justifying an arrest as "facts and circumstances within the 
officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable 
caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 
(1979). In the present case there was w offense, and therefore no probable cause. 
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Defendant was being arrested for intoxication. The facts articulated in the police 
report indicate that Defendant's eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred and he had a 
hard time keeping his balance. There is a difference between being intoxicated and being 
guilty of the crime of intoxication. It is not against the law for a citizen to drink alcohol and 
become "drunk" or intoxicated. The criminal offense of intoxication is found in section 76-9-
701. Subsection one reads: 
A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol, a 
controlled substance, or any substance . . . to a degree that the person may 
endanger himself or another, hi a public place or in a private place where 
he unreasonably disturbs other persons. U.C.A. §76-9-701(2004). 
In State v. Tram, 57 P.3d 1052 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court addressed a 
factual situation that was somewhat similar to the one in the case at bar. There are some 
important distinctions however. In Trane, Salt Lake City police officers were notified that a 
man was harassing customers at a convenience store. When an officer arrived the defendant 
was standing by some public telephones. A store clerk pointed at the defendant indicating 
that he was the focus of the complaint. Id at 1054-55. As the officer approached the 
defendant he smelled alcohol on his person and breath. The officer also observed the 
defendant being loud; behaving in a "tumultuous-type manner"; using profanity and the 
defendant was using his hands to express himself. The defendant also "puffed his chest out 
[and] took a defensive posture similar to a boxer". Id at 1055. When the officer asked for the 
defendant's identification, he refused to comply. The defendant was eventually arrested for 
intoxication and resisting arrest. When he was searched incident to arrest, cocaine was found 
on his person. Id 
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On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the defendant challenged his arrest for 
intoxication. The Supreme Court found that it was a valid arrest. Of importance to this case is 
the Court's listing of the elements of public intoxication. The Court held that a "person 
commits the crime of public intoxication under the Utah Code when that person 'is under the 
influence of alcohol . . . to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a 
public place . . . where he unreasonably disturbs other persons.'" Id at 1062 (quoting, U.C.A. 
§ 76-9-701(l)(1999)). 
One of the elements of intoxication is that the person "unreasonably disturbs other 
persons." In Tram, the defendant was "loud" and behaving in a "tumultuous-type" of manner. 
Id at 1062. He was also harassing the convenience store clerk. In the case at bar, the 
Defendant was minding his own business when he was approached by the officers. After he 
told them he hadn't done anything he attempted to leave. It was as he was walking away that 
an officer physically grabbed his arm, put it in a twist lock and then took him to the ground. 
The Defendant hadn't unreasonably disturbed anyone. For these reasons there was no 
probable cause to support the arrest of the Defendant. 
Once this Court has established that there was a constitutionally impermissible seizure 
of the Defendant, the next issue is to what extent does this constitutional violation affect the 
evidence that was found during the search incident to arrest. In the case of Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) the U.S. Supreme Court stated, u[t]he exclusionary 
rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as 
a direct result of an unlawful invasion." 
The Utah Courts have likewise followed the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In 
State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah Ct App. 1998) this Court held: 
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Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule, Mapp requires us to exclude 'all 
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution/ 
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct. at 1691. There is no dispute that the stop of 
defendant at the Tibbie Fork Canyon traffic checkpoint was unconstitutional. 
Nor is there any dispute that, absent the good faith exception, all evidence 
obtained subsequent to defendant's stop should be suppressed as "fruit of the 
poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 
407,417,9L.Ed.2d441(1963). 
If the Defendant didn't commit an offense, then the officers had no legal basis to 
justify a warrantless search and the exclusionary rule would apply. In State v. Hechtle, 89 
P.3d 185 (Utah C. App. 2004), the Court of Appeals stated, '[a]n officer must have probable 
cause . . . to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense." Id at 188 
(citations and quotations omitted). 
Probable cause determinations are reviewed under an "objective standard: whether 
from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly . . . be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in 
believing that the suspect had committed the offense for which he was arrested." Id at 
189(alterations in original)(citations and quotations omitted). As has been previously stated, 
it is not against the law for a person to be intoxicated. A person has to also unreasonably 
disturb others. There was no indication that the Defendant had disturbed anyone. For these 
reasons the officers were not justified in believing that the Defendant had committed the 
offense of intoxication. 
Since the Defendant didn't violate the law, the officers did not have probable cause to 
arrest him. The contraband, which was found during the subsequent search incident to arrest, 
should be suppressed by the trial court. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests 
this Court to suppress the evidence that was found during said search. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant was arrested for an offense which requires him to unreasonably disturb 
other people. The Defendant was minding his own business when the officers encountered 
him and decided to arrest him for intoxication. Since the officers did not have probable cause 
to effectuate the arrest, the evidence which was discovered during the search incident to arrest 
should be suppressed. 
DATED this /Jday of January 2006. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress to: 
Weber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Blvd., 2nd Floor 
Ogden, UT 84401 
postage prepaid this JO day of January 2006 
; M. Ryan 
Legal Secretary 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 051905998 
Judge W. Brent West 
COMES NOW, Nathan D. Lyon, Deputy Weber County Attorney, and respectfully 
submits this Memorandum of Law to support the State's Objection to Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. 
FACTS 
On November 27, 2005 at approximately 1:54 a.m., Officer Jamie Boots was dispatched 
to the area of 3204 Lincoln Avenue on the complaint of fighting in front of Jessie's Barbershop. 
Ogden Police Officers Boots, Draper, and Eggerman responded to the scene. 
Upon arrival, the Officers did not observe any individuals in the area. However, their 
attention was attracted to back parking lot of the barbershop when they saw and heard an 
individual stumbling up against vehicles parked in the parking lot. It was at that time that Officer 
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Boots observed an individual who, because he was unable to maintain his balance as he walked, 
was banging up against vehicles. This caused Officer Boots concern as this individual appeared 
to be very intoxicated and was headed toward the busy road of 32nd Street. 
Officer Boots approached the individual and asked him if he had seen any fighting in the 
area. The individual, who was later identified as Michael Henderson (Defendant), turned and 
replied, "Man, I didn't do shit." At this time Officer Boots could smell a very strong odor of 
alcohol coming from the Defendant. Additionally, the Defendant's eyes appeared bloodshot, his 
speech was slurred, and the Defendant was having difficulty maintaining his balance. At this 
time, the Defendant had his hands in his coat pockets. Officer Boots permissively asked the 
Defendant if he would mind taking his hands out of his pockets. The Defendant refused this 
request and continued to fumble with something in his pocket. Fearing that the Defendant might 
have a weapon, Officer Boots then ordered the Defendant to remove his hands from his pockets. 
The Defendant refused this order, and turned and started to walk away. 
Officer Boots immediately ordered the Defendant to stop and place his hands behind his 
back, though he doesn't remember whether he verbally articulated to the Defendant was he was 
under arrest. The Defendant, with his right hand still fidgeting with something in his pocket, 
refused this command and took a step away from the Officers. Officer Boots ordered the 
Defendant to stop and take his hands out of his pockets. The Defendant again refused this order. 
Fearing that the Defendant might have a weapon, Officer Boots grabbed the Defendant and 
placed the Defendant's left arm in a twist lock. The Defendant tried to turn and pull away from 
Officer Boots's grasp. In this struggle, the Defendant was taken to the ground. Officer Boots 
continued to order the Defendant to remove his hands from his pockets, and Officer Eggerman 
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was unable to physically remove the Defendant's hands from his coat pockets. During this 
struggle, Officer Boots struck the Defendant twice in the back. At this same time, Officer Draper 
was also assisting Officer Boots try to remove the Defendant's hands from his coat pockets. 
Officer Draper also delivered several blows with his knee to the Defendant's thigh in effort to 
remove his hands from his pockets. Officers Eggerman and Boots were finally able to gain 
control of the Defendant's hands and place them into handcuffs. While placing the Defendant's 
hands into the cuffs, Officer Boots saw in the Defendant's right hand a plastic baggy containing a 
substantial amount of white ivory rick like substance. 
The Defendant was brought to his feet and asked if he needed medical attention. The 
Defendant replied, "Fuck you." Because there were no visible signs of physical injury, no 
medical was requested. Officer Boots read the Defendant his Miranda rights and asked if he 
would talk with him about the situation. The Defendant replied, "Fuck you, I want my lawyer 
right now!" 
The white substance flashed positive for cocaine and the Defendant was transported to the 
Weber County Jail. While waiting to be booked at the jail, the Defendant fell of the bench due to 
his intoxication. 
DISCUSSION 
The Defense asserts that Officer Boots lacked probable cause to effectuate an arrest for 
public intoxication under Utah Code Ann. §76-9-701(1) because the Defendant was not 
unreasonably disturbing anyone. Rather, he was simply drunk and minding his own business. 
The State asserts that the Defendant's interpretation of §76-9-701(1) is too limiting. A 
careful reading of the statute shows that unreasonably disturbing others is only one way in which 
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a person may violate §76-9-701(1). One of the other ways occurred in this case. Specifically, 
Officer Boots observed the Defendant in a public place in an extremely intoxicated state where it 
appeared that he was a danger either to himself or the public. Based on these observations, 
Officer Boots had probable cause to arrest the Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
OFFICER BOOTS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE 
DEFENDANT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has outlined the three types of citizen encounters with law 
enforcement officials: 
A level one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a 
consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to a 
non-coercive questioning by an officer. Since the encounter is 
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is not 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
A level two encounter involves an investigative detention that is 
usually characterized as a brief and non-intrusive. Although it is a 
Fourth Amendment seizure, probable cause is not required. Rather, 
when specific and articulable facts and rational inferences give rise 
to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime, an 
officer may initiate an investigative detention without consent. 
A level three encounter involves an arrest, which has been 
characterized as a highly intrusive or lengthy detention that 
requires probable cause. A level three encounter is also a Fourth 
Amendment seizure. 
State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002) (Internal quotations and citations omitted) 
(Emphasis added). 
Officer Boots's initial contact with the Defendant was a level one encounter. Officer 
Boots had been dispatched to investigate a fight at Jesses's Barbershop. When he approached the 
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Defendant, he permissively asked whether the Defendant had seen any fighting. The Defendant 
was under no obligation to speak with Officer Boots and was free to leave. However, the 
Defendant voluntarily spoke with Officer Boots. 
After speaking with the Defendant, Officer Boots had probable cause to escalate the 
encounter to a level three stop. Because a level three encounter must be supported by probable 
cause, Officer Boots's stop would be justified as a level three stop if he had probable cause. The 
Utah Supreme Court explained that the determination of whether the police have probable cause 
to arrest without a warrant "should be made on an objective standard: whether from the facts 
known to the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and 
prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in believing that the suspect had 
committed the offense." State v. Cole, 61A P.2d 119,125 {Utah 1983) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
In this case, Officer Boots believed that the Defendant had committed the offense of 
public intoxication: 
A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of 
alcohol, a controlled substance, or any substance having the 
property of releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the person may 
endanger himself or another, in a public place or in a private place 
where he unreasonably disturbs other persons. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-9-701 (1). 
Therefore, Officer Boots had probable cause to arrest the Defendant if a reasonably 
prudent person making the same observations as Officer Boots would have believed that the 
Defendant was intoxicated to the level that he posed a threat of danger to himself or the public 
while being in a public place. The relevant question then becomes what did Officer Boots 
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observe and were those inferences he made reasonable under the circumstances. 
The fair and reasonable inferences drawn from Officer Boots's observations would justify 
a reasonably prudent person to believe that the Defendant posed a threat of danger to himself or 
the public while he was in a public place. After asking the Defendant if he had seen any fighting, 
the Defendant responded, "I didn't do shit". At this time Officer Boots observed that the 
Defendant's speech was slurred, his eyes were bloodshot, his sense of balance was compromised, 
and he had a very strong odor of alcohol coming fromJiim. Additionally, Officer Boots's initial 
observation of the Defendant was that of the Defendant banging up against cars because he could 
not maintain his balance. Before Officer Boots made contact with him, the Defendant was 
attempting to walk toward 32nd street, which is a busy road. The Defendant, presumably trying to 
walk home, notwithstanding his inability to even properly walk, coupled with his poor sense of 
balance when stopped, his blood shoot eyes, slurred speech, and the strong odor of alcohol 
coming from the defendant certainly would justify a reasonably prudent person to conclude that 
the Defendant in his then present state posed a threat to himself or the public. 
Because Officer Boots had probable cause to justify stopping the Defendant, the 
subsequent discovery of contraband was properly discovered. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State requests the Court deny Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. 
Dated the (j day of February, 2006. 
Nathan D. Lyon 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered on this day of February, 2006, a copy of the 
foregoing STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS to: 
Bernard Allen 
2550 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION 
Case No. 051905998 
Judge W. Brent West 
COMES NOW, Nathan D. Lyon, Deputy Weber County Attorney, and objects to 
the Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and requests this Court 
clarify its ruling. Specifically, this Court in its oral ruling initially stated that the Officers had 
probable cause to arrest the Defendant, but never told the Defendant that he was under arrest, 
thus failing to use the "magic words". In elaborating its ruling, the Court later stated that the 
Officers lacked probable cause to arrest the Defendant. For purposes of maintaining the record, 
the State respectfully requests this Court to clarify its ruling. 
Dated the ({£ day of March, 2006. 
\ 
Nathan D. Lyon 
Deputy Weber County Attx^ rrfiey 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered on this day of March, 2006, a copy of the foregoing 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION to: 
Bernard Allen 
2550 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Ryan Bushell 
298 24th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 . 
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Ryan J. Bushell, #8843 
Attorney for Defendant 
The Law Office of Ryan J. Bushell, P.C. 
298 24th Street, Suite 230 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 612-9505 
Facsimile: (801) 612-9565 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 051905998 
Judge W. Brent West 
This matter came on for a suppression hearing on February 8, 2006 on this Court's 
regular law and motion calendar. The Court, having heard the arguments and testimony, and 
having read the briefs of the parties, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 27, 2005, Officer Jamie Boots was dispatched to 3204 Lincoln Avenue on 
a complaint of a flight. Officers Draper and Eggerman were also dispatched to the area. 
2. Upon arrival, the officers did not initially see any individuals in the area. 
3. Officer Boots heard a noise he later associated to be the Defendant stumbling in the back 
parking lot of the address in question and observed that the Defendant was walking 
toward 32nd street with his hands in his pockets. 
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4. Officers approached the Defendant and observed that he had both hands inside the front 
pockets of his sweatshirt. 
5. Officers asked him if he had any knowledge of a fight in the area. 
6. The Defendant replied that he "didn't do shit." 
7. Officer Boots believed that the Defendant was intoxicated due to the Defendant's glassy 
eyes, slurred speech, unsteadiness on his feet, and the strong smell of alcohol coming 
from his person. 
8. Officer Boots observed the Defendant's right hand was fumbling with something in the 
pocket. 
9. Officer Boots asked the defendant if he wouldn't mind taking his hands out of his 
pockets. 
10. The Defendant removed his left hand only to show he had nothing in his hand, but he 
never removed his right hand. 
11. Due to officer safety concerns, Officer Boots repeatedly requested that the Defendant 
remove his hands from his pockets. During these repeated requests, the Defendant 
continued to fidget with something in his right pocket. 
12. Officer Boots then stated to the Defendant that he was no longer asking the Defendant to 
take his hands out of his pockets, but was telling him to do so. 
13. At this time the Defendant turned away from the Officers and began to walk away. 
14. Officer Boots told the Defendant to stop and again told him to take his hands out of his 
pockets. 
15. The Defendant had only gone a few feet when Officer Boots was able to grab the 
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Defendant by his left arm. 
16. Because the Defendant physically resisted Officer Boots's efforts to remove his right 
hand from his pocket, Officer Boots put the Defendant in a twist lock and took the 
Defendant to the ground. 
17. Officer Boots continued to try to get the Defendant's right hand out of his pocket and 
behind his back. 
18. Officer Eggerman and Draper also assisted Officer Boots in trying to remove the 
Defendant's hand from his pocket. During this time the Defendant continued to struggle 
against the officers. 
19. Officer Boots then exerted two closed fist punches to the small of the Defendant's back in 
an attempt to gain control of the Defendant. 
20. Officers Boots, Draper, and Eggerman finally gained control over the Defendant's right 
hand and place it behind his back, placing the Defendant in handcuffs. 
21. While placing the Defendant's hands in cuffs, Officer Boots noticed a clear plastic baggie 
containing a white rock substance gripped in the defendant's right hand. 
22. At no time during the incident did Officer Boots or any other officer present inform the 
Defendant he was under arrest for public intoxication or for interfering with arrest. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Officer Boots had reasonable articulable suspicion to perform a weapons frisk on the 
Defendant for officer safety. 
2. Officer Boots did not have probable cause to escalate the weapons frisk to search for 
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weapons. 
3. Officer Boots went beyond the scope of a weapons frisk and proceeded to an arrest 
without ever informing the Defendant that he was under arrest. 
4. The Fourth Amendment requires an officer to inform an individual that they are under 
arrest. Because Officer Boots did not inform the Defendant that he was under arrest, 
Officer Boots violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
5. Because Officer Boots went beyond the scope of a weapons frisk and failed to inform the 
Defendant that he was under arrest, the subsequent discovery of contraband is fruit of the 
poisonous tree and is hereby suppressed. 
Dated the <•> — day of May, 2006. 
W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form 
Nathan D. Lyon 
Deputy Weber CountyvAjtorney 
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ALLEN: 
COURT: 
ALLEN: 
COURT: 
ALLEN: 
COURT: 
OGDEN, UTAH FEBRUARY 8, 2006 
WHICH MATTER DO WE HAVE HERE? 
THIS IS MICHAEL HENDERSON, YOUR 
ALL RIGHT. I WAS TOLD THIS ONE 
WHAT? 
IS THIS ONE GOING? 
YEAH, IT'S A LITTLE HEARING. 
OH, ALL RIGHT. 
HONOR. 
WAS GOING. 
MR. ALLEN: A SUPPRESSION HEARING. 
MR. BUSHELL: JUDGE, REALLY QUICKLY ON THIS MATTER, 
COURT MIGHT RECALL, I ENTERED MY APPEARANCE PRIVATELY ON THIS 
CASE AFTER MR. ALLEN HAD SET THIS DATE AND PREPARED HIS 
MOTION SO — 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. BUSHELL: — WE'RE GONNA TAG TEAM IT TODAY, AND 
AFTER TODAY, I'LL BE HANDLING THE MATTER. 
THE COURT: IT'S A LITTLE UNFAIR TO MR. LYON TO HAVE 
BOTH OF YOU BEAT UP ON HIM. 
MR. ALLEN: WELL, IT MIGHT BE, YOUR HONOR. MIGHT BE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR 
HEARING. IS THE STATE READY? 
MR. LYON: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ANY OPENING STATEMENT? 
MR. LYON: NO. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
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MR. ALLEN: DO I START? 
THE COURT: YES. 
MR. ALLEN: YOU HAVE THE MEMORANDUM? 
THE COURT: I DO. 
MR. ALLEN: I ASSUME YOU GOT MR. LYON'S? 
THE COURT: I DID. 
MR. ALLEN: OKAY. WE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO GO THROUGH 
THE POLICE REPORT. WE MET PREVIOUSLY AT THE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING. SPOKE TO THE POLICE ON THE CASE. SPOKE TO THE — 
MR. LYON ABOUT THAT. INDICATED WE WAIVED THE PRELIM BACK ON 
THE 7TH OF DECEMBER. IN GOING THROUGH THE INFORMATION IN 
THIS CASE, YOUR HONOR, THERE'S — THERE'S SOME THINGS THAT 
ARE VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU NEED TO KNOW. THE OPENING 
ARGUMENT IN THIS CASE IS THAT THE — -THIS IS AN ARREST WITH 
NO PROBABLE CAUSE WHATSOEVER. THE OFFICERS WERE CALLED TO A 
SPECIFIC THING INVOLVING A — SUPPOSEDLY A FIGHT OUT IN FRONT 
OF THIS BARBERSHOP. THE OFFICERS ARRIVED. I DON'T KNOW HOW 
MUCH LONGER, HOW LATE FROM WHEN THE ACTUAL INITIAL CALL TOOK 
PLACE, BUT BY THE TIME THEY GOT THERE, THERE WAS NOTHING 
HAPPENING. THERE WAS NO FIGHT, THERE WAS NO PEOPLE MILLING 
AROUND, THERE WAS NOTHING HAPPENING. THE OFFICERS, RATHER 
THAN GOING INSIDE THE BARBERSHOP AND TALKING TO ANYBODY, 
APPARENTLY WALKED AROUND TO THE BACK OF THE BARBERSHOP. AND 
IN THE BACK OF THE BARBERSHOP, THEY INDICATED THEY SAW 
MR. HENDERSON. HE WAS BY HIMSELF. HE WAS NOT CAUSING A 
1 DISTURBANCE. HE WAS NOT DOING ANYTHING THAT RESULTED IN THE 
2 POLICE OFFICERS BEING CALLED. THE OFFICER ASKED HIM IF HE 
3 KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT HAD BEEN GOING ON WITH THE FIGHT. 
4 AND THE OFFICER — AND THE DEFENDANT RESPONDED APPROPRIATELY, 
5 I DIDN'T DO ANYTHING, AND TURNED TO WALK AWAY. THE OFFICER 
6 HAD NO PROBABLE CAUSE WHATSOEVER OR EVEN A REASONABLE 
7 SUSPICION THAT MR. HENDERSON WAS INVOLVED IN ANYTHING OR 
8 ANY — ANYTHING ABOUT WHY HE WAS CALLED. AND YET HE AND 
9 OFFICER DRAPER DEMANDED THAT HE TAKE HIS HANDS OUT OF HIS 
10 POCKETS. WELL, HE'S WALKING AWAY FROM THEM. AND THEY STATE 
11 VERY CLEARLY IN THEIR POLICE REPORT THAT HE WAS NOT ONLY 
12 WALKING AWAY FROM THEM, BUT WAS GAINING GROUND FROM THEM. SO 
13 HE CLEARLY WAS NOT CAUSING ANY KIND OF THREAT TO THEM. HE 
14 WAS A THREAT OF NOTHING TO THE POLICE OFFICERS. HE HADN'T 
15 DONE ANYTHING. HE HADN'T DONE ANYTHING THAT HAD RESULTED IN 
16 THEIR BEING CALLED. THEY CLAIM THAT HE WAS STUMBLING, THEY 
17 SAY, ALTHOUGH — AND THEIR CLAIM IS THAT THEY WERE TALKING TO 
18 HIM ABOUT PUBLIC INTOXICATION. BUT THERE IS NOTHING THAT HE 
19 WAS DOING THAT LOOKED LIKE HE WAS ENDANGERING HIMSELF OR 
20 CAUSING A DISTURBANCE WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO CONSIDER 
21 PUBLIC INTOXICATION IN THIS CASE. AND WHEN HE INDICATED HE 
22 DIDN'T WANNA SPEAK TO THEM, AND APPROPRIATELY WALKED AWAY, HE 
23 DIDN'T RUN, HE DIDN'T DIVE INTO THE, YOU KNOW, BETWEEN CARS, 
24 HE DIDN'T ATTEMPT TO ELUDE THEM IN ANY WAY, HE SIMPLY WALKED 
25 AWAY. WHEN HE DID THAT, OFFICER DRAPER AND OFFICER BOOTS, OF 
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COURSE HE WAS ATTACKED AND THROWN TO THE GROUND AND — AND 
ARRESTED AND LATER SEARCHED WHERE THEY FOUND THE EVIDENCE 
THAT WE INTEND — WE REQUEST BE SUPPRESSED. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. ALLEN: THAT'S THE CIRCUMSTANCE. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. RESPONSE. DO YOU HAVE ANY 
ARGUMENT — HAVE ANY OPENING STATEMENT YOU WANNA MAKE? 
MR. LYON: I ASSUME YOUR HONOR'S READ MY BRIEF. 
THE COURT: I HAVE. 
MR. LYON: AND I THINK WE'RE READY TO GO ON THAT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. CALL YOUR WITNESS. 
MR. LYON: THE STATE CALLS OFFICER JAMIE BOOTS. 
JAMIE BOOTS, 
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED 
AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LYON: 
Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, OCCUPATION, CURRENT 
ASSIGNMENT, AND EXPERIENCE? 
A. IT'S OFFICER JAMIE BOOTS. RIVERDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
PATROL OFFICER. I'VE BEEN A PATROL OFFICER — I'VE BEEN AN 
OFFICER FOR FOUR YEARS NOW. 
Q. WERE YOU — PREVIOUS TO WORKING WITH RIVERDALE, WERE YOU 
EMPLOYED WITH OGDEN CITY POLICE? 
A. I WAS. 
1 Q. WERE YOU SO EMPLOYED ON NOVEMBER 27TH, 2005? 
2 A. I WAS. 
3 Q. WERE YOU WORKING THAT DAY? 
4 A. I WAS. 
5 Q. AND AT APPROXIMATELY 1:54 A.M., WERE YOU DISPATCHED TO 
6 THE AREA OF JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 32ND — 
7 OR 3204 LINCOLN AVENUE? 
8 A. I WAS. 
9 Q. WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE DISPATCH; DO YOU RECALL? 
10 A. IT WAS A DISTURBANCE FIGHT, THAT'S WHAT THE DISPATCH 
11 CAME IN AS. 
12 Q. WHEN YOU RESPONDED — DID YOU RESPOND THERE? 
13 A. I DID. 
14 Q. WHAT DID YOU OBSERVE WHEN YOU ARRIVED AT THE AREA? 
15 A. WHEN I PULLED INTO THE AREA, I DIDN'T SEE ANY 
16 INDIVIDUALS FIGHTING AT ALL. I EXITED MY VEHICLE. AND WAS 
17 TALKING WITH MY BACKING OFFICERS WHEN — 
18 Q. WHO WERE YOUR BACKING OFFICERS? 
19 A. THERE WAS OFFICER DRAPER AND HIS PROBATION OFFICER, 
20 AGERMAN. 
21 Q. OKAY. AND SO WHILE YOU WERE SPEAKING WITH — WITH 
22 OFFICER DRAPER, DID ANYTHING UNUSUAL HAPPEN WHILE YOU WERE 
23 SPEAKING WITH HIM? 
24 A. WHILE I WAS SPEAKING WITH HIM, WE WERE STANDING ON 
25 LINCOLN AVENUE, AND I HEARD SOME — KIND OF LIKE A BANG, AND 
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TURNED AROUND AND NOTICED A GENTLEMAN FALLING AGAINST — IN 
BETWEEN TWO VEHICLES PARKED IN THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE 
PARKING LOT. 
Q. OKAY. COULD YOU — I GUESS FOR THE COURT HELP — HELP 
US UNDERSTAND WHERE YOU — FROM WHERE YOU'RE STANDING, WHAT 
DO YOU SEE? DO YOU SEE THE FRONT OF JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP OR 
THE BACK OR WHAT — WHAT EXACTLY CAN YOU SEE FROM YOUR 
STANDPOINT? 
A. WHERE I'M PARKED ON LINCOLN AVENUE, I'M IN FRONT OF 
JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP, AND THEY HAVE A THROUGH PARKING LOT THAT 
DRIVES FROM LINCOLN INTO THE BACK PARKING LOT AND THEN ALSO 
GOES OUT TO 32ND STREET. WHERE I WAS PARKED, I COULD SEE 
RIGHT DOWN THE PARKING LOT INTO THE BACK AREA. 
Q. OKAY. AND IS THAT THAT TIME THAT YOU HEARD A BANG AND 
YOU LOOKED BACK AND YOU — YOU COULD SEE SOMEONE AT THAT 
TIME? 
A. I — I COULD. 
Q. OKAY. WHAT DID YOU DO AFTER YOU SAW THIS INDIVIDUAL? 
A. I APPROACHED HIM. OFFICER DRAPER AND MYSELF AND AGERMAN 
APPROACHED HIM TO SEE IF HE HAD SEEN ANY OF THE FIGHT. 
Q. OKAY. AND DID YOU SAY ANYTHING TO HIM? 
A. WHEN I APPROACHED HIM? 
Q. YES. 
A. WHEN I APPROACHED HIM, I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD ANY 
KNOWLEDGE OF ANY DISTURBANCE, ANY FIGHT, HE SAW ANYTHING. 
1 Q. OKAY. AND DO YOU RECALL WHAT — DID HE SAY ANYTHING IN 
2 RESPONSE TO YOU? 
3 A. HE DID. HE STATED, MAN, I DIDN'T DO SHIT. 
4 Q. DID YOU RESPOND TO THAT? 
5 A. I — 
6 Q. DID YOU SAY ANYTHING IN RESPONSE TO THAT? 
7 A. I JUST LOOKED AT HIM AND I COULD — WHY — WHEN HE 
8 SPOKE, WHEN WE START APPROACHING HIM, NOTICEABLE SMELL OF 
9 ALCOHOL COMING FROM HIS BREATH WHEN HE SPOKE TO US. WE WERE 
10 WITHIN TWO, THREE FEET OF HIM AT THIS POINT. HE WAS HAVING A 
11 HARD TIME KEEPING HIS BALANCE, SWAYING BACK AND FORTH. AND I 
12 JUST LOOKED AT HIM AND SAID, THAT'S NOT WHAT I ASKED YOU, AND 
13 YOU'RE INTOXICATED. 
14 Q. OKAY. DID YOU NOTICE ANY OTHER — ANY OTHER 
15 CHARACTERISTICS THAT WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE HAD BEEN DRINKING? 
16 A. HIS EYES WERE BLOODSHOT. WHEN HE SPOKE TO ME, HIS 
17 SPEECH WAS SLURRED. LIKE I SAID, HE HAD A HARD TIME KEEPING 
18 HIS BALANCE. HE WAS — WHEN I NOTICED HIM, HE WAS KIND OF 
19 BOUNCING BACK AND FORTH OFF OF THE TWO CARS IN THE BACK 
20 PARKING LOT. THAT'S WHAT DREW MY ATTENTION TO HIM. 
21 Q. OKAY. AND AT THIS POINT IN TIME, WAS THERE ANYTHING 
22 ABOUT THE DEFENDANT THAT WAS MAKING YOU UNEASY? 
23 A. YEAH. HIS HANDS WERE INSIDE HIS POCKETS, AND THAT 
24 AREA'S KNOWN FOR HIGH CRIME, WEAPONS, YOU KNOW, FIGHTS. 
25 WE'RE DISPATCHED TO FIGHTS THERE ALL THE TIME. AND HE 
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STARTED FUMBLING AROUND WITH — HIS RIGHT HAND WAS INSIDE HIS 
FRONT SWEATSHIRT POCKET. HE HAD A ZIP-UP SWEATSHIRT. HIS 
HANDS WERE INSIDE IT AND I NOTICED HIS RIGHT HAND MOVING 
QUITE A BIT. AND SO I ASKED HIM IF HE WOULDN'T MIND TAKING 
HIS HANDS OUT OF HIS POCKETS FOR ME. 
Q. OKAY. NOW, WHEN YOU ASKED HIM — DESCRIBE HOW YOU ASKED 
HIM. DID YOU — DID YOU SAY IT IN A FORCEFUL MANNER? OR DO 
YOU RECALL THE EXACT LANGUAGE THAT YOU SAID TO HIM? 
A. I SAID, MAN, YOU WOULDN'T MIND TAKING YOUR HANDS OUT OF 
YOUR POCKETS, WOULD YOU? 
Q. OKAY. AND DID HE RESPOND TO YOU? 
A. HE JUST KIND OF LOOKED AT US. HE TOOK HIS ONE HAND OUT 
AND JUST KIND OF PUT IT UP LIKE THIS AND THEN STUCK IT BACK 
IN, BUT THE OTHER ONE, HE JUST MOVED HIS SWEATSHIRT LIKE 
THIS, AND THEN PUT IT BACK DOWN. 
Q. OKAY. SO YOU — YOU'RE — WHAT YOU'RE SHOWING US, HE 
TOOK HIS LEFT HAND OUT OF HIS POCKET, BUT HE KEPT HIS RIGHT 
HAND INSIDE. 
A. HE DID. HE PULLED IT UP AND PULLED THE SWEATSHIRT AND 
THEN PUT HIS HAND BACK IN AND CLOSED HIS SWEATSHIRT BACK UP. 
Q. OKAY. WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THAT? 
A. I SAID, HEY, JUST TAKE YOUR HANDS OUT OF YOUR POCKETS 
FOR ME. 
Q. WAS — WAS HE — WAS THE RIGHT-HAND REMAINED INSIDE THE 
RIGHT POCKET? 
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1 A. IT DID, AND HE STILL CONTINUED TO SHUFFLE HIS HAND 
2 AROUND. 
3 Q. OKAY. AND WHAT DID YOU DO AT THAT TIME? 
4 A. AFTER ASKING HIM MULTIPLE TIMES TO REMOVE HIS HANDS FROM 
5 HIS POCKETS AND HE WOULDN'T, I FINALLY SAID, OKAY, I'M NOT 
6 ASKING YOU THIS TIME. I'M TELLING YOU, TAKE YOUR HANDS OUT 
7 OF YOUR POCKETS. 
8 Q. OKAY. NOW, WHEN YOU'RE — WHILE YOU'VE ASKED — YOU SAY 
9 THAT YOU ASKED HIM SEVERAL TIMES TO TAKE HIS HANDS OUT OF HIS 
10 POCKETS. WAS HE WALKING AWAY FROM YOU AT THIS TIME? 
11 A. NO. HE WAS JUST STANDING THERE TALKING TO US, JUST 
12 WOULDN'T TAKE HIS HANDS OUT OF HIS POCKETS. 
13 Q. OKAY. AND WHEN YOU FINALLY STATED, I'M NOT ASKING YOU, 
14 I'M TELLING YOU TO TAKE YOUR HANDS OUT OF HIS POCKET — OUT 
15 OF HIS POCKETS, WHAT DID — WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THAT? 
16 A. HE JUST KIND OF MUMBLED. I DON'T RECALL ANYTHING THAT 
17 WAS REALLY SAID. HE TURNED AND STARTED TO WALK AWAY FROM US. 
18 Q. OKAY. AND WHAT DID YOU DO? 
19 A. I YELLED AT HIM AGAIN, TAKE HIS HANDS OUT OF HIS 
20 POCKETS. HE BEGAN TO STEP EVEN FURTHER AWAY. AND BECAUSE OF 
21 IT BEING HIGH-CRIME AREA, ASSAULTS THERE ALL THE TIME, IT 
22 TURNED INTO AN OFFICER SAFETY ISSUE, WITH HIM TURNING AWAY 
23 FROM US, KEEPING HIS HANDS INSIDE HIS POCKETS. SO I REACHED 
24 OUT TO GRAB HIS LEFT HAND TO REMOVE IT FROM THE POCKET. 
25 Q. OKAY. AND I GUESS YOU'VE — YOU'VE TOUCHED A LITTLE BIT 
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ABOUT OFFICER SAFETY. HAVE YOU HAD, BASED ON YOUR 
EXPERIENCE, HAD PEOPLE TRY TO WALK AWAY FROM YOU AND THEN 
LATER TURNED AROUND WITH WEAPONS? 
A. I HAVE. 
MR. ALLEN: I'LL OBJECT. TALK ABOUT A LEADING QUESTION. 
THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
Q. (BY MR. LYON) HAVE YOU HAD ENCOUNTERS WITH INDIVIDUALS 
WHO HAVE LATER HAD WEAPONS ON THEM? 
A. I HAVE. 
Q. OKAY. AND HAVE — HAVE THESE INDIVIDUALS TRIED TO WALK 
AWAY FROM YOU? 
A. THEY HAVE. 
Q. OKAY. 
MR. ALLEN: AGAIN, I'LL OBJECT. IT'S IMMATERIAL. 
MR. LYON: YOUR HONOR, I DON'T THINK IT'S IMMATERIAL. 
WHAT THIS OFFICER'S TRYING TO STATE IS BASED ON HIS 
EXPERIENCE, HE'S HAD — 
MR. ALLEN: THE FACT THAT SOMEBODY MAY HAVE HAD A WEAPON 
AT SOME TIME AND TRIED TO WALK AWAY FROM HIM IS NOT THE POINT 
OF THIS SITUATION. AND IT'S IMMATERIAL TO THIS CASE. 
THE COURT: NO. GOES TO THE TERRY FRISK STOP PRINCIPLES 
OF AN OFFICER'S ABILITY TO PAT DOWN. OVERRULED. QUESTION 
WAS LEADING AGAIN, MR. ALLEN, BUT IT IS MATERIAL. GO AHEAD. 
Q. (BY MR. LYON) OKAY. AND WHAT DID YOU — WHEN HE STARTED 
TO WALK AWAY FROM YOU, WHAT DID YOU DO? 
1 SUBSTANCE THAT WAS LATER N.I.K. TESTED AND TESTED POSITIVE 
2 FOR COCAINE. 
3 Q. OKAY. DID YOU STAND HIM UP AFTER THAT? 
4 A. WE ROLLED HIM OVER. WE SEARCHED THE REST OF HIS PERSON. 
5 AND THEN WE STOOD HIM UP AND ESCORTED HIM TO MY VEHICLE. 
6 Q. OKAY. DID HE RECEIVE ANY MEDICAL ATTENTION? 
7 A. NO. I ASKED HIM SEVERAL TIMES IF HE WANTED ANY MEDICAL 
8 ATTENTION. THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF INJURY TO HIM VISUALLY, 
9 AND HE JUST KEPT RESPONDING WITH PROFANITIES, AND DECLINED. 
10 Q. OKAY. AND ONE THING I FORGOT TO BRING OUT, OFFICER 
11 BOOTS. GOING BACK TO THE — WHEN YOU INITIALLY SAW THE — 
12 WHEN YOU'RE STANDING OUT ON LINCOLN STREET AND YOU INITIALLY 
13 HEARD THIS BANG NOISE, AND YOU LOOK OVER AND YOU SEE WHOSE --
14 SEE THIS INDIVIDUAL IN THE PARKING LOT, DID YOU — DID YOU — 
15 WERE YOU ABLE TO SEE IN WHAT DIRECTION THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS 
16 HEADING? 
17 A. YES, I DID. HE WAS — HE WAS, LIKE I SAID, IN THE BACK 
18 SOUTHWEST -- OR SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE PARKING LOT IN 
19 BETWEEN TWO VEHICLES. AND IT'S FENCED ALL ALONG BOTH SIDES, 
20 AND HE WAS WALKING COMING OUT OF THE VEHICLES TOWARD THE 
21 CORNER OF THE BARBERSHOP INTO THE MIDDLE OF THE PARKING LOT. 
22 Q. OKAY. AND IS THAT — I GUESS IF HE'S HEADING THAT 
23 DIRECTION, IS THAT HEADED TOWARD 32ND STREET? 
24 A. YES. 
25 Q. AND ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH 32ND STREET? 
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A. I AM. I PATROLLED THE AREA FOR A YEAR LAST YEAR. 
Q. OKAY. WHAT'S THAT STREET LIKE? 
MR. ALLEN: I'LL OBJECT. IMMATERIAL. WHAT'S IT LIKE. 
YOU KNOW WHAT 32ND STREET'S LIKE? 
THE COURT: WELL — 
MR. ALLEN: FIRST OF ALL, THE QUES — THE QUESTION IS 
VAGUE. DOESN'T — I DON'T KNOW WHAT HE'S EVEN ASKING. 
SECOND, WHAT'S 32ND STREET LIKE, THAT'S IMMATERIAL. 
THE COURT: I AGREE THE QUESTION COULD BE — THE 
QUESTION COULD BE BETTER PUT, BUT THE QUESTION FOR TERRY 
FRISK AND STOP IS WHAT THE NEIGHBORHOOD AREA IS LIKE IN 
RELATIONSHIP TO CRIME. IF THAT'S WHERE HE'S HEADED, IT'S 
MATERIAL AND RELEVANT. IF THAT'S NOT WHERE HE'S HEADED AND 
HE JUST WANTS TO TELL ME IT'S A STREET FULL OF POTHOLES, I 
AGREE WITH YOU, MR. ALLEN. SO THE QUESTION NEEDS TO BE 
REPHRASED, MR. LYON. 
MR. LYON: I'LL REPHRASE — I'LL RESTATE THE QUESTION. 
Q. (BY MR. LYON) IS 32ND STREET A BUSY STREET? 
A. DURING THE NIGHTTIME, IT'S ONE OF THE BUSIEST STREETS IN 
THAT AREA, YES. 
Q. OKAY. NOW, OFFICER BOOTS, I'VE HAD A CHANCE TO READ 
YOUR POLICE REPORT AND YOU'VE INDICATED TODAY ON THE STAND 
SEVERAL THINGS THAT ARE NOT INSIDE YOUR POLICE REPORT. DO 
YOU HAVE AN EXPLANATION AS TO WHY THAT IS? 
A. A POLICE REPORT'S MAINLY JUST TO — SO THAT WE CAN 
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1 A. I REACHED OUT AFTER HE STARTED GAINING A FEW FEET ON ME. 
2 I REACHED OUT, STEPPED UP QUICKLY, GRABBED HIS LEFT ARM TO 
3 CONTROL HIS ONE ARM. AND AT THAT POINT, HAND STILL IN HIS 
4 RIGHT POCKET, HE TRIED TURNING AND PULLING AWAY FROM MY 
5 GRASP, AWAY FROM MY HOLD, AND TO MOVE FARTHER. AND SO THAT'S 
6 WHEN I PLACED HIM IN A TWIST LOCK AND ESCORTED HIM TO THE 
7 GROUND WHERE HE WAS PLACED ON HIS STOMACH. 
8 Q. OKAY. AND WERE YOU SAYING ANYTHING TO HIM AT THIS POINT 
9 IN TIME? 
10 A. I WAS THE WHOLE TIME, I WAS TELLING HIM, TAKE YOUR HAND 
11 OUT OF YOUR POCKET, GET YOUR HAND OUT, AND TELLING HIM QUIT 
12 RESISTING. WE'RE — EVERYTHING THAT YOU CAN SAY AT THAT 
13 POINT, WE JUST WANTED TO GET CONTROL OF THAT RIGHT HAND 
14 BECAUSE SOME MOVEMENT AND I COULDN'T SEE WHAT WAS INSIDE HIS 
15 HAND. 
16 Q. WAS HE — WAS HE ~ WHAT WAS HE DOING AT THIS POINT IN 
17 TIME? 
18 A. HE WAS FIGHTING WITH US THE WHOLE TIME TRYING TO GET OUT 
19 OF OUR HOLD. 
20 Q. OKAY. DID YOU DO ANYTHING TO TRY TO GET THAT RIGHT HAND 
21 OUT FROM THE POCKET? 
22 A. I DID. AFTER HE WAS TAKEN TO THE GROUND, I HAD CONTROL 
23 OF HIS LEFT ARM. OFFICER AGERMAN WAS TRYING TO PULL HIS 
24 RIGHT HAND OUT FROM UNDERNEATH HIS TORSO BECAUSE HE WOULDN'T 
25 REMOVE IT STILL FROM THE POCKET AFTER BEING ON THE GROUND. 
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1 AND SO I ENDED UP EXERTING TWO DISTRACTION BLOWS TO THE LOWER 
2 LEFT SIDE OF HIS BACK. 
3 Q. OKAY. 
4 A. SO THAT THEY COULD GET CONTROL OF THAT ARM. 
5 Q. DO YOU KNOW OF ANY — IF ANYTHING ELSE, ANY SORT OF 
6 DISTRACTION BLOWS WERE DELIVERED TO THE DEFENDANT BESIDE WHAT 
7 YOU — 
81 A. I BELIEVE THAT OFFICER DRAPER EXERTED SOME DISTRACTION 
9 BLOWS. 
10 Q. OKAY. 
11 MR. ALLEN: I'M NOT SURPRISED. 
12 Q. (BY MR. LYON) WERE YOU FINALLY ABLE TO GET THE — WERE 
13 YOU FINALLY ABLE TO GET THE RIGHT HAND OUT OF THE POCKET? 
14 A. AFTER THE DISTRACTION BLOWS WERE EXERTED, OFFICER 
15 AGERMAN WAS ABLE TO PULL HIS HAND FROM UNDERNEATH HIS TORSO 
16 AND GET CONTROL OF THE RIGHT ARM. 
17 Q. OKAY. DID YOU HANDCUFF HIM? 
18 A. I DID. 
19 Q. AND WHILE HANDCUFFING THE DEFENDANT, DID YOU OBSERVE 
20 ANYTHING UNUSUAL? 
21 A. I DID. IN HIS RIGHT HAND, I NOTICED A CLEAR PLASTIC 
22 BAGGIE STILL GRIPPED IN HIS HAND. WHEN I PLACED IN HIS RIGHT 
23 HAND INTO THE CUFF, I ALREADY HAD HIS LEFT HAND IN THE CUFF. 
24 WHEN I PLACED HIS RIGHT HAND IN THE CUFF, I OPENED HIS HAND 
25 AND NOTICED A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF WHITE IVORY ROCK LIKE 
1 RECALL THE ACCOUNTS, TO REFRESH OUR MEMORIES. CAN'T ALWAYS 
2 PUT EVERYTHING, EVERY LITTLE DETAIL IN THE REPORT. IT'S 
3 IMPOSSIBLE, IT'LL NEVER HAPPEN. AND SO WE WRITE THESE 
4 REPORTS TO REFRESH OUR MEMORIES WHEN WE TESTIFY IN SITUATIONS 
5 LIKE THIS. 
6 MR. LYON: NOTHING FURTHER. 
7 THE COURT: MR. ALLEN. 
8 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. ALLEN: 
10 Q. SO AT THE TIME THAT YOU WROTE THE REPORT, YOU DIDN'T 
11 THINK IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PUT IN THE REPORT WHAT DREW YOUR 
12 ATTENTION TO THIS PERSON; IS THAT RIGHT? 
13 A. NOW — 
14 Q. THIS PERSON THAT YOU JUST ARRESTED AND CAME UP WITH A 
15 REASON TO ARREST, YOU DIDN'T THINK IT WAS IMPORTANT IN 
16 WRITING THE REPORT TO COME UP WITH SOME REASON THAT HE DREW 
17 YOUR ATTENTION TO HIM; IS THAT RIGHT? 
18 A. DREW MY ATTENTION, IT COULD HAVE BEEN PUT IN THERE. 
19 IT'S NOT REALLY DETRIMENTAL TO THE CASE BECAUSE --
20 Q. I DON'T WANT YOUR IMPRESSION OF WHETHER IT'S DETRIMENTAL 
21 TO THE CASE. WHAT I'M ASKING YOU IS, THE REASON THAT YOU 
22 SUPPOSEDLY HAD YOUR ATTENTION DRAWN TO THIS INDIVIDUAL, YOU 
23 DIDN'T THINK WAS MATERIAL; IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE TELLING US 
24 TODAY? 
25 A. NO, THAT'S NOT WHAT I'M TELLING YOU ~ 
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1 g. HONESTLY, OFFICER BOOTS? 
2 A- NO, THAT'S NOT WHAT I'M TELLING YOU. 
3 Q. OKAY. SO IT WASN'T IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO PUT IN YOUR 
4 EEPORT. 
5 A. IT COULD HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT. 
6 Q. BUT IT WASN'T BECAUSE YOU DIDN'T, RIGHT? 
7 A. I DIDN'T PUT IT IN THE REPORT. 
8 0. OKAY. AND NOT ONLY DIDN'T YOU PUT IT YOUR REPORT, BUT 
9 OFFICER DRAPER DIDN'T PUT IT IN HIS REPORT EITHER, DID HE? 
10 MR. LYON: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO THAT — 
11 THE WITNESS: I DIDN'T WRITE OFFICER DRAPER'S REPORT, SO 
12 I CAN'T ANSWER THAT QUESTION. 
13 Q. (BY MR. ALLEN) WELL, I HAVE IT RIGHT HERE. WOULD YOU 
14 LIKE TO LOOK AT IT? 
15 A. NO, BECAUSE I'M NOT TESTIFYING FOR OFFICER DRAPER. 
16 Q. OH, NOW YOU'RE A LAWYER. 
17 A. NO, I'M JUST — 
18 MR. ALLEN: MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH, YOUR HONOR? 
19 THE WITNESS: — HERE FOR ME-
20 THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
21 MR. ALLEN: THANK YOU. 
22 Q. (BY MR. ALLEN) I'D LIKE YOU TO PERUSE OFFICER DRAPER'S 
23 REPORT AND JUST ANSWER THE QUESTION, IS THERE ANYTHING IN 
24 THAT REPORT ABOUT ANYBODY BANGING ON CARS, RICOCHETING OFF OF 
25 CARS, MAKING ANY BANGING NOISE OR ANY NOISE WHATSOEVER? 
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A. YOU'LL HAVE TO ASK OFFICER DRAPER THAT — 
Q. NO, I'M ASKING YOU TO LOOK AT THE REPORT AND — 
MR. LYON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ALLEN: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ALLEN: 
TO FIND OUT — 
THE COURT: 
HERE? 
MR. LYON: 
THE COURT: 
WHAT MR. ALLEN 
MR. LYON: 
WHAT — A S FAR 
YOUR HONOR, I'M GONNA OBJECT AS TO RELEVANCE. 
WELL, IT IS RELEVANT — 
HE'S — HE'S BROUGHT UP ~ 
— HAVE YOU READ THE REPORT — 
— THE THING ABOUT THE REPORTS. I'M TRYING 
HAVE YOU READ THE REPORT? IS OFFICER DRAPER 
NO. 
HAVE YOU READ THE REPORT? DOES IT CONTAIN 
SAYS? 
I'VE READ THE REPORT. I'M NOT SURE EXACTLY 
AS BANGING GOES, I DON'T — I DON'T RECALL 
READING ANYTHING LIKE THAT. 
THE COURT: 
MR. ALLEN: 
THE COURT: 
POINT'S MADE, MR. ALLEN. MOVE ON. 
MAY I APPROACH AGAIN, YOUR HONOR? 
YOU MAY. BECAUSE I AGREE, THIS OFFICER 
CAN'T BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR A REPORT HE DIDN'T WRITE. 
MR. ALLEN: WELL, BUT HE DID RAISE THE ISSUE OF WHAT 
REPORTS WERE FOR. 
THE COURT: 
MR. ALLEN: 
I AGREE. 
AND I THINK IT'S VERY INTERESTING THAT BOTH 
OFFICERS FIND IT IMMATERIAL TO WRITE WHY THEY THOUGHT THAT — 
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WHY THEIR ATTENTION WAS DRAWN TO THIS PERSON. 
THE COURT: AND AS I SAID, POINT'S MADE. 
MR. ALLEN: THANK YOU. 
Q. (BY MR. ALLEN) IN FACT, WOULD IT SURPRISE YOU TO KNOW 
THAT OTHER REPORT — OFFICER DRAPER'S REPORT SAYS HE JUST SAW 
THAT YOU SAW HIM WALKING IN THE REAR DRIVEWAY AREA. PERIOD. 
AND THAT IS THE ONLY DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT HE WAS DOING BACK 
THERE. 
A. YOU'LL HAVE TO TALK TO OFFICER DRAPER ABOUT THAT. 
Q. OKAY. LET'S TALK ABOUT YOUR REPORT. YOU SAID THAT YOU 
HAD A REFUSED COMPLAINANT AT 1:54 IN THE MORNING — 
A. YES. 
Q. — RIGHT? 1:54 IN THE MORNING YOU APPEARED AT JESSIE'S 
BARBERSHOP BECAUSE YOU WERE TOLD THAT PEOPLE WERE PHYSICALLY 
FIGHTING IN FRONT OF JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP. DO YOU KNOW WHEN 
YOU GOT THAT DISPATCH, WHAT TIME? 
A. I DON'T. 
Q. DO YOU KNOW HOW LONG IT TOOK YOU TO GET TO JESSIE'S 
BARBERSHOP FROM THE TIME YOU GOT THE DISPATCH? 
A. 
Q. 
I DON'T. 
BY THE TIME YOU 
JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP, 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
NO. 
GOT 
WAS 
THERE WERE NO PEOPLE 
NO. 
THERE, 
THERE? 
J • 
THERE WAS NOTHING IN FRONT OF 
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1 Q. THERE WAS NO REFUSED COMPLAINANT? 
2 A. YEAH, THERE WAS A REFUSED COMPLAINANT. 
3 Q. THERE WAS NO REFUSED COMPLAINANT STANDING THERE IN FRONT 
4 OF JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP. 
5 A. A REFUSED COMPLAINANT MEANS THEY DON'T WANT CONTACT — 
6 Q. I GET IT, AND HE WASN'T THERE, WAS HE? 
7 A. NO. 
8 Q. AND NOBODY ELSE WAS THERE IN FRONT OF THE BARBERSHOP. 
9 A. NO. 
10 Q. AND AS YOU LOOKED DOWN THE STREET, WAS THERE SOMEBODY 
11 THAT CAUSED YOU TROUBLE ON 32ND STREET AT JESSIE'S 
12 BARBERSHOP? 
13 A. NOT AT THE TIME I WAS THERE. 
14 Q. OKAY. SO AT THAT POINT IN TIME, THE REASON YOU HAD BEEN 
15 CALLED APPARENTLY HAD DISSIPATED ON ITS OWN, SO THERE WAS NO 
16 REASON FOR YOU TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE THAT ISSUE; IS THAT 
17 RIGHT? 
18 A. NO, THAT'S NOT THE CASE. THERE COULD HAVE BEEN SOMEONE 
19 INJURED THAT EVERYBODY RAN FROM. 
1 
20 Q. DID YOU SEE SOMEBODY INJURED? 
21 A. I DID NOT. THAT'S WHY I STOOD IN THE AREA FOR A FEW 
22 MINUTES. 
23 Q. YOU THEN, ACCORDING TO YOUR REPORT, SAID, MICHAEL 
24 HENDERSON WAS NOTICED STUMBLING AROUND IN THE BACK PARKING 
25 LOT OF JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP. 
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1 A. YES. 
2 Q. AGAIN, NO DESCRIPTION OF HIM BANGING OFF OF CARS OR ANY 
3 NOISE WHATSOEVER. 
4 A. NOT IN THAT REPORT, NO. 
5 Q. AND THIS IS AT 1:54 IN THE MORNING? 
6 A. IF THAT'S WHAT'S ON THE REPORT. I DON'T RECALL. IT WAS 
7 MANY MONTHS AGO. 
8 Q. LITTLE DARK AT THAT TIME, ISN'T IT? 
9 A. YES, THAT'S A DARK AREA. 
10 Q. OKAY. AND SO WHEN YOU WENT BACK AND NOTICED SOMEBODY IN 
11 THE BACK PARKING LOT, YOU WENT BACK TO ASK HIM IF HE KNEW 
12 ANYTHING ABOUT THIS DISTURBANCE. 
13 A. I DID. 
14 Q. WHICH WAS AN APPROPRIATE THING TO DO. 
15 A. IT IS. 
16 Q. AND HE SAID, I DIDN'T SEE SHIT, I DIDN'T DO SHIT — 
17 A. THAT'S — 
18 Q. — I'M NOT THERE. 
19 A. YES. 
20 Q. AND THEN HE ATTEMPTED TO WALK AWAY. 
21 A. NO, HE DID NOT. 
22 Q. THAT'S WHAT YOUR REPORT SAYS. 
23 A. NO. AFTER THE MULTIPLE TIMES OF ASKING HIM TO REMOVE 
24 HIS HANDS FROM POCKETS AFTER I STOOD THERE AND TALKED WITH 
25 HIM. THERE WERE SEVERAL CHANCES FOR HIM TO WALK AWAY PRIOR 
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TO ME ASKING HIM TO REMOVE HIS HANDS. 
Q. YOU INDICATE IN YOUR REPORT, MICHAEL — I TOLD MICHAEL 
TO STOP AND TAKE HIS HANDS OUT OF HIS POCKET — OH, 
OFFICER — MYSELF, OFFICER DRAPER, OFFICER AGERMAN, AND HE 
BEGAN TO ~ MICHAEL IMMEDIATELY TURNED AWAY — THIS IS YOUR 
REPORT. MICHAEL IMMEDIATELY TURNED AWAY FROM OFFICER DRAPER, 
OFFICER AGERMAN, AND MYSELF, AND BEGAN TO WALK AWAY. I TOLD 
MICHAEL TO STOP AND TAKE HIS HAND OUT OF HIS POCKETS. 
MICHAEL WAS BEGINNING TO GAIN DISTANCE FROM ME. I REACHED 
OUT AND GRABBED HIS LEFT ARM, PULLING TO THE — TO THE — 
PULLED HIM TO YOUR CONTROL THING, YOU SAID. 
A. IT ALSO STATES IN THERE THAT BEFORE HE GOT TO THAT 
SECOND SENTENCE IN THERE THAT IT SAID, I ASKED — 
Q. AND YOU — 
A. — MICHAEL HENDERSON TO REMOVE HIS HANDS FROM HIS 
POCKETS. 
Q. YOU IN FACT SAID — AND I'LL QUOTE WHAT YOU'VE JUST 
TESTIFIED TO. YOU IN FACT SAID, YOU WOULDN'T MIND TAKING 
YOUR HAND OUT OF YOUR POCKET, WOULD YOU. 
A. RIGHT. 
Q. THAT'S WHAT YOU SAID. 
A. THAT'S WHAT I SAID THE INITIAL TIME. 
Q. THAT'S NOT A POLICE COMMAND. 
A. NO, NOT THE FIRST TIME. AND DID — AND I ALSO TESTIFIED 
TO LATER AFTER THE THIRD OR FOURTH TIME, I CAN'T RECALL 
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EXACTLY, I STATED, OKAY. I'M NOT ASKING YOU NOW, I'M TELLING 
YOU, TAKE YOUR HANDS OUT — 
Q. I HEARD YOU SAY THAT — 
A. — O F YOUR POCKETS — 
Q. I HEARD YOU SAY THAT. HOW — HOW OFTEN HAD YOU AS AN 
OGDEN CITY POLICE OFFICER WORKED WITH OFFICER DRAPER? 
A. QUITE A BIT. 
Q. IS HE THE ONE WHO TAUGHT YOU THE — WHAT WAS PROBABLE 
CAUSE AND WHEN — WHEN IT WAS OKAY TO USE FORCE? 
A. NO, HE DID NOT. 
Q. I SEE. WHY DID OFFICER DRAPER HAVE A PROBATION OFFICER 
THERE WITH HIM? 
A. BECAUSE HE'S AN F.T.O. AND THERE WAS A NEW HIRE THAT IS 
GOING THROUGH HIS TEST PHASE. 
Q. WAS HE THERE TO BE — TO ACT AS A PROBATION OFFICER TO 
YOU OR ACT AS A PROBATION OFFICER TO OFFICER DRAPER? 
YOU SAID HE WAS THERE AS A PROBATION OFFICER. I 
DIDN'T — I DIDN'T MAKE THAT UP. 
A. OKAY. OFFICER DRAPER IS OFFICER AGERMAN'S F.T.O., HIS 
FIELD TRAINING OFFICER — 
Q. SO HE'S THE — 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
OFFICER AGERMAN — 
-- OFFICER THAT'S ON PROBATION. 
YES. 
BEING TRAINED BY OFFICER DRAPER. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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A. 
Q. 
YES. 
NOW, WERE YOU 
MANNER — 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
NO, I WAS NOT. 
SO YOU 
YES, I 
I SEE. 
LEARNED 
DID. 
TRAINED BY OFFICER DRAPER IN 
YOUR TECHNIQUES 
WHEN YOU INDICATE YOU 
THAT 
FROM SOME OTHER 
ESCORTED HIM 
SAME 
OFFICER. 
TO THE 
GROUND, YOUR THREW HIM DOWN. 
A. NO, I DID NOT. 
Q. TO CONTROL HIM; ISN'T THAT CORRECT? 
A. NO, I DID NOT. 
Q. I SEE. AND THEN YOU AND BOTH — BOTH YOU AND OFFICER 
APER — OFFICER DRAPER EXERCISED DISTRACTION BLOWS, YOU'VE 
TESTIFIED, RIGHT? 
A. I BELIEVE OFFICER DRAPER DID. I HAVE NOT READ HIS 
REPORT. HE WAS BEHIND ME — 
Q. YOU TESTIFIED TO THAT; I DIDN'T MAKE THAT UP. 
A. I KNOW, AND I SAID I BELIEVE HE DID. 
Q. I NOTICE IN THE POLICE REPORT INDICATION OF A N.I.K. 
TEST ON THE STUFF YOU SAY YOU FOUND. I DON'T NOTICE ANY 
BREATHALYZER TEST OR ANY TYPE OF INDICATION TO DETERMINE THE 
ALCOHOLIC CONTENT OF MR. HENDERSON. 
A. WE'RE NOT REQUIRED TO DO — 
Q. I DIDN'T ASK THAT — 
A. — BREATHALYZER — 
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Q. — I NOTICE THERE WASN'T ONE. 
A. THAT'S BECAUSE I DIDN'T DO ONE. 
MR. ALLEN: I SEE. NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: REDIRECT? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LYON: 
Q. OFFICER BOOTS, WHEN YOU WENT BACK TO — TO THE BACK OF 
JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP AND SPOKE WITH DEFENDANT, HOW QUICKLY DID 
YOU NOTICE THE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION? 
A. IMMEDIATELY. 
Q. OKAY. AND WAS THERE ANYONE ELSE IN THAT AREA? 
A. NO. 
Q. COULD YOU — YOU STATED THAT YOU COULD SMELL ALCOHOL? 
A. I COULD. 
Q. HOW STRONG WAS THAT SMELL? 
A. IT WAS STRONG ENOUGH THAT I COULD SMELL IT FROM THREE OR 
FOUR FEET AWAY. 
Q. OKAY. AND HOW QUICKLY DID YOU OBSERVE HIS PHYSICAL 
SIGNS OF INTOXICATION? 
A. IMMEDIATELY FROM THE MOMENT I SAW HIM FROM LINCOLN 
STUMBLING IN BETWEEN THE TWO CARS TO THE POINT TO WHERE I 
APPROACHED HIM, HE WAS UNEASY ON HIS FEET. 
MR. LYON: OKAY. NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: MR. ALLEN, ANYTHING ELSE? 
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BY 
Q. 
MR. ALLEN: 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
JUST — JUST TO MAKE THIS ONE POINT FAIRLY CLEAR, 
DON'T MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT CARS IN 
IN 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
YOUR REPORT, 
I DO NOT. 
YOU DON'T 
DO NOT. 
DO YOU? 
MENTION ANY STUMBLING 
THAT PARKING 
BETWEEN CARS. 
LOT 
YOU 
AT ALL 
THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE? 
MR. ALLEN: NOTHING FURTHER. 
EXAMINATION 
BY THE COURT: 
Q. WELL, I GOT A COUPLE QUESTIONS. JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP, I 
THIS A RESIDENTIAL AREA OR A COMMERCIAL AREA? 
A. IT'S A RESIDENTIAL AREA, BUT IT'S A BUSINESS IN THE 
RESIDENTIAL AREA. 
Q. DESCRIBE IT TO ME. I MEAN, IS IT A BIG PLAZA WITH 
MULTIPLE BUSINESSES — 
A. NO, IT'S — IT'S A — IT'S LIKE A HOUSE. IT'S THE SIZE 
OF A HOUSE THAT HE'S TURNED INTO A BARBERSHOP UPSTAIRS. 
Q. OKAY. THE AREA, IS IT A HIGH-CRIME, MODERATE-CRIME, 
LOW-CRIME AREA? DO YOU — 
A. IT'S A HIGH-CRIME. 
Q. AND YOU SAID YOU WORKED THERE FOR A YEAR? 
A. I DID. 
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Q. ALL RIGHT. AND THAT WAS YOUR PATROL AREA? 
A. IT WAS. 
Q. NOW, WHEN YOU MADE THE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION ON 
MR. HENDERSON, DID YOU EVER SAY THE MAGIC WORDS THAT HE WAS 
UNDER ARREST? 
A. THE ATTORNEY AND I TALKED ABOUT IT, AND EVERYTHING 
HAPPENED SO FAST THAT I WAS — I CAN'T REMEMBER IF I TOLD HIM 
OR NOT. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
ALL RIGHT. DID YOU BOOK HIM FOR PUBLIC INTOXICATION? 
I DID. 
SO THAT WAS ON THE BOOKING? 
IT WAS. 
AND HAS HE BEEN CHARGED WITH PUBLIC INTOXICATION? 
MR. LYON: YES. 
THE WITNESS: AFTER HE WAS PLACED IN MY VEHICLE, HE WAS 
TOLD WHAT — EVERYTHING HE WAS BEING CHARGED WITH. 
Q. (BY THE COURT) DURING THE TIME THAT YOU INDICATE THAT HE 
WAS WRESTLING OR STRUGGLING WITH YOU, DID YOU PLACE HIM UNDER 
ARREST FOR INTERFERING OR ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE? 
A. I DID. I — I CAN'T REMEMBER IF I PUT INTERFERING ON 
THERE OR NOT. 
Q. WELL, DID YOU EVER SAY THE MAGIC WORDS — 
I'LL BE CANDID. THE ISSUE HERE IS WHETHER OR NOT YOU 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A TERRY STOP, AND THEN WHETHER YOU CAN 
GO IMMEDIATELY FROM FRISKING TO YOUR PROTECTION AND TO AN 
1 IMMEDIATE ARREST. BUT WHAT'S IMPORTANT IS WHAT STEPS ARE 
2 TAKEN IN REGARDS TO THE ARREST. 
3 ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, OFFICER. YOU MAY STAND DOWN. 
4 ANY OTHER WITNESSES? WE GONNA HEAR FROM OFFICER DRAPER OR 
5 OFFICER AGERMAN? 
6 MR. LYON: NO. 
7 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WANNA RESPOND TO MR. ALLEN'S 
8 OPENING STATEMENT? 
9 MR. LYON: YOUR HONOR, WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS OFFICER 
10 BOOTS GOES TO JESSIE'S BARBERSHOP ON THE COMPLAINT OF 
11 FIGHTING. AND HE SHOWS UP. HE'S THERE WITH DRAPER AND 
12 AGERMAN. HE'S HANGING OUT. DOESN'T SEE ANYTHING. THEY'RE 
13 JUST KIND OF TALKING WITH ONE ANOTHER. OFFICER BOOTS HEARS 
14 THIS BANGING UP AGAINST A VEHICLE. HE GOES TO LOOK AT THIS 
15 INDIVIDUAL WHO IS — AT THE TIME, HE'S WALKING TOWARD 32ND 
16 STREET, WHICH IS A BUSY STREET. HE GOES BACK JUST TO TALK 
17 WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL. SAYS, HEY, HAVE YOU SEEN ANY FIGHTING. 
18 HE SAYS, MAN, I DIDN'T DO SHIT. AND AT THAT POINT IN TIME, 
19 OFFICER BOOTS SMELLS STRONG ODOR OF ALCOHOL, SEES BLOODSHOT 
20 EYES, SEES — I GUESS OBSERVES SLURRED SPEECH. HE OBSERVES 
21 THAT THE DEFENDANT IS HAVING A HARD TIME MAINTAINING HIS 
22 BALANCE AT THAT TIME, AS WELL AS WHEN HE INITIALLY SAW THIS 
23 INDIVIDUAL BANGING UP AGAINST CARS, HAVING A HARD TIME 
24 MAINTAINING HIS BALANCE. 
25 YOUR HONOR, IT'S THE STATE'S POSITION AT THAT POINT IN 
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TIME THAT OFFICER BOOTS HAS PROBABLE CAUSE THAT HE CAN MAKE 
AN ARREST OF THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR PUBLIC INTOX TO KEEP HIM — 
HIMSELF OR THE PUBLIC SAFE. HE'S — 
THE COURT: BUT WHAT LEADS ME TO BELIEVE HE'S MAKING 
ARREST? ALL HE EVER ASKED HIM TO DO WAS TO TAKE HIS HANDS 
OUT OF HIS POCKET. THAT'S SEEMS TO ME TO BE A SEARCH. AT 
TWO — TWO OPPORTUNITIES THIS OFFICER HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
SAY THE MAGIC WORDS, YOU'RE UNDER ARREST FOR PUBLIC 
INTOXICATION. NOW TAKE YOUR HANDS OUT OF YOUR POCKET. OR 
YOU'RE UNDER ARREST FOR INTERFERING WITH A POLICE OFFICER. 
NOW TAKE YOUR HANDS OUT OF YOUR POCKET. 
ALL HE EVER ASKS THIS PERSON TO DO WAS TO TAKE HIS HANDS 
OUT OF HIS POCKET AND SHOW HIM WHAT'S THERE. NOW, HOW DO 
I — HOW DO I GET BEYOND THIS ~ A TERRY FRISK STOP IN THE 
FIRST INSTANCE? HOW DO WE GET TO AN ARREST? DON'T THEY SAY 
THE MAGIC WORDS? 
MR. LYON: WELL, I GUESS, YOUR HONOR, THE WAY THAT 
OFFICER BOOTS ~ MY UNDERSTANDING FROM HIS TESTIMONY IS HE'S 
SAYING HE'S — THAT HE SAID, WELL, DO YOU MIND TAKING YOUR 
HANDS OUT OF YOUR POCKETS. AND HE — THE DEFENDANT TAKES HIS 
LEFT HAND OUT OF HIS POCKET, BUT HE KEEPS HIS RIGHT HAND 
INSIDE HIS POCKET. AND THAT WAS THE HAND THAT OFFICER BOOTS 
TESTIFIED THAT HE HAD SEEN FIDGETING AND THAT WAS THE HAND 
THAT WAS MAKING HIM NERVOUS. 
THE COURT: OKAY. SO DOESN'T THAT THEN UNDER THE STOP 
1 AND FRISK OF TERRY JUSTIFY A PAT-DOWN SEARCH BY THE OFFICER, 
2 BUT HOW DO WE GO TO FULL-FLEDGED ARREST WHEN ONCE AGAIN, THE 
3 OFFICER'S ONLY FOCUS FROM HIS TESTIMONY IS TAKE YOUR HANDS 
4 OUT OF THE POCKET. I WANNA SEE WHAT'S IN YOUR POCKET. WHAT 
5 HAVE YOU GOT IN YOUR HAND. 
6 MR. LYON: WELL, YOU — 
7 THE COURT: IT SEEMS TO BE ON SEARCH, NOT ON ARREST. I 
8 MEAN HE COULD HAVE VERY EASILY JUST AT THAT POINT SAID, 
9 YOU'RE UNDER ARREST FOR PUBLIC INTOXICATION, HANDCUFFED HIM, 
10 SEARCHED HIM, AND WE'RE NOT EVEN HERE. 
11 MR. LYON: I — YOUR HONOR, MY UNDERSTANDING IS THIS 
12 HAPPENED SO QUICKLY THAT HE DOESN'T HAVE TIME TO SAY, YOU'RE 
13 UNDER — YOU'RE UNDER ARREST. HE'S — HE'S FIDGETING WITH 
14 SOMETHING IN HIS HAND. HE'S — HE'S TAKING STEP AWAY FROM 
15I ME. OFFICER BOOTS IS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT HIM PULLING A 
16 WEAPON OUT FROM INSIDE OF HIS POCKET THAN SAYING — AND 
17 TRYING TO WORRY ABOUT HIS OWN PERSONAL SAFETY THAN SAYING, 
18 YOU'RE UNDER ARREST. AND — 
19 THE COURT: BUT THAT ENDS — THAT ENDS ANY INQUIRY. MY 
20 NEXT QUESTION IS HOW DOES THIS DIFFER FROM THE CASE THAT 
21 JUDGE HADLEY WAS REVERSED ON WITH THE GUY RIDING THE BICYCLE 
22 UP AT WEBER STATE WHEN THE GUY RODE HIS BICYCLE AWAY AND THE 
23 POLICE WENT AND GOT HIM AND PULLED HIM OVER, GOT IN A TUSSLE, 
24 WRESTLED WITH HIM, AND THEN THE OFFICER, RATHER THAN PATTING 
25 HIM DOWN, REACHED DOWN AND LIFTED UP THE GUY'S LEG AND FOUND 
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A WEAPON THERE, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS SAID, ON A STOP AND 
FRISK, ALL YOU CAN DO IS PAT DOWN, OR IF YOU CAN ESCALATE 
YOUR PROBABLE CAUSE TO AN ARREST, MAKE YOUR ARREST. SO HOW 
DOES THIS DIFFER FROM THAT CASE THAT WAS A COUPLE MONTHS AGO 
WHERE — 
MR. LYON: YOUR HONOR, I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE — I KNOW 
I'VE READ THAT CASE. IT'S BEEN A WHILE, AND I CAN'T — 
THE COURT: IT'S IN YOUR GUY'S THING. I'M HAVING THE 
LAW CLERKS PULL — 
MR. LYON: I'LL BE HAPPY TO RESPOND TO THAT IF YOUR 
HONOR WOULD LIKE — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. LYON: — WITH A SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OR WHATEVER 
YOU'D LIKE, BUT — 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. MR. ALLEN, YOU GOT A 
RESPONSE? 
MR. ALLEN: I DO. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. THIS OFFICER 
HAS A PROBLEM, YOUR HONOR. THIS CASE HAPPENS 1:54 AT NIGHT. 
IT'S DARK, PURSUANT TO HIS OWN DESCRIPTION. WE ALL KNOW IT'S 
DARK AT 1:54 AT NIGHT. HE WRITES A VERY DETAILED REPORT, 
POLICE REPORT, ABOUT THIS INCIDENT. HE WRITES TWO PAGES OF 
REPORT. OFFICER DRAPER WRITES A SUBSEQUENT PAGE OF REPORT. 
NEITHER ONE OF THEM MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT A NOISE, ABOUT 
BANGING, ABOUT BUMPING INTO ANYTHING, ABOUT CAUSING ANY KIND 
OF DISTURBANCE. WHAT'S HAPPENED HERE IS THEY'VE GONE THROUGH 
1 THIS SITUATION, KNOCKED THIS GUY DOWN BECAUSE HE WASN'T 
2 COMPLYING WITH THEIR ORDERS, WHICH WERE NOT APPROPRIATELY 
3 TAKEN BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T PUT HIM UNDER ARREST AND DIDN'T 
4 HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASK HIM TO DO THOSE THINGS. AND THEY 
5 REALIZED THAT NOW — THEY DIDN'T AT THE TIME APPARENTLY — 
6 THAT INTOXICATION REQUIRES SOME KIND OF DISTURBANCE. THE 
7 TRAIN CASE THAT WE QUOTED FOR YOU AND PUT IN FRONT OF YOU IS 
8 VERY CLEAR THAT THAT INDIVIDUAL WAS THE ONE CAUSING THE 
9 PROBLEM. THE POLICE HAD BEEN CALLED FOR THAT PROBLEM. THEY 
10 HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE TALKING TO HIM BECAUSE HE WAS THE 
11 ONE CAUSING THE DISTURBANCE UNDER THE PUBLIC INTOXICATION 
12 LAW. IT IS NOT INHERENTLY AGAINST THE LAW TO BE INTOXICATED. 
13 THIS DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT HE — HE MAY HAVE HAD — MAY HAVE 
14 BEEN SLURRED SPEECH OR SMELL OF ALCOHOL, IS TOTALLY 
15 IMMATERIAL. 
16 THE COURT: BUT ISN'T IT A TWO-PRONG — AREN'T YOU ON — 
17 ISN'T IT AGAINST THE LAW TO BE PUBLIC INTOXICATED IN A PUBLIC 
18 PLACE OR UNREASONABLY DISTURB — 
19 MR. ALLEN: NOT ACCORDING TO THE STATUTE. IF YOU READ 
20 THE STATUTE, THEY'RE REQUIRED TO BOTH. AND IT'S VERY 
21 INTERESTING THAT IT'S ALL DARK AND TOTALLY DARK AND THEY'RE 
22 TELLING US HE'S GOT BLOODSHOT EYES FROM FOUR OR FIVE FEET 
23 AWAY. THIS — THE POLICE REPORT IN THIS CASE IS ABYSMAL. 
24 THEY REALIZE THAT THEY CAN'T ~ THEY HAVE NO REASON 
25 WHATSOEVER TO EVEN APPROACH MR. HENDERSON BECAUSE HE HASN'T 
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DONE A THING. HE'S SITTING THERE OR BACK THERE MINDING HIS 
OWN COMPLETE BUSINESS — 
THE COURT: WELL, WHY WOULDN'T THIS BE — WHY WOULDN'T 
THIS BE A TERRY FRISK? IT'S A HIGH-CRIME AREA, IT'S LATE AT 
NIGHT, THEY'VE BEEN CALLED TO A DISTURBANCE. DON'T THEY HAVE 
THE RIGHT TO — 
MR. ALLEN: THEY MIGHT HAVE HAD THE RIGHT TO DO THAT, 
BUT THEY DIDN'T DO THAT. THEY NEVER ~ THEY NEVER INVOKED A 
TERRY FRISK. THEY NEVER WALKED UP TO HIM AND SAID — 
THE COURT: WELL, THEY HAD — YOU SAID THEY HAD NO RIGHT 
TO APPROACH HIM. THEY HAD THE RIGHT TO APPROACH HIM, ASK HIM 
WHY HE WAS THERE — 
MR. ALLEN: ANYBODY HAS A RIGHT TO APPROACH, AND THEY 
COULD HAVE — THEY CAN ASK A QUESTION. AND WHEN HE SAYS, I 
DIDN'T DO ANYTHING AND IS HEADING AWAY FROM HIM, I THINK 
THEIR POSITION IS FINISHED UNTIL — 
THE COURT: WAIT A MINUTE — WAIT A MINUTE — 
MR. ALLEN: — THEY EITHER — 
THE COURT: NOW, I HAVE TROUBLE WITH THAT. I DON'T 
THINK THAT'S THE STRONGEST POINT OF YOUR CASE. SINCE WHEN 
DOES THE PERSON WHO'S ABOUT TO BE ARRESTED GET TO MAKE THAT 
DETERMINATION THAT THERE'S NOTHING WRONG? AREN'T THE 
OFFICERS ENTITLED UNDER ~ 
MR. ALLEN: NO ~ 
THE COURT: — A STOP AND FRISK TO MAKE SURE THAT 
1 THEY'RE SAFE AND THAT THERE IS NOTHING GOING ON? I MEAN IF 
2 YOU ASK A THIEF WHAT'S GOING ON, THEY'RE GOING TO TELL YOU 
3 NOTHING'S GOING ON, AND THAT DOES NOT END THE INQUIRY. I 
4 THINK YOUR STRONGEST ARGUMENT HERE IS THERE'S -- HE SHOULD 
5 HAVE ARRESTED HIM AND THERE WAS — 
6 MR. ALLEN: THAT'S MY SECOND ARGUMENT, YOUR HONOR, BUT 
7 BEFORE WE EVER — 
8 THE COURT: I GUESS I'M NOT TELLING — I ' M NOT BUYING 
9 THE FIRST ONE. 
10 MR. ALLEN: NO, I — THAT'S THEIR JOB TO TALK ABOUT 
11 WHETHER HE WAS ARRESTED — 
12 THE COURT: I'M NOT BUYING YOUR ARGUMENT. I THINK — I 
13 THINK THIS FALLS INTO A CLASSIC TERRY FRISK APPROACH. NOW, 
14 THE QUESTION BECOMES WHETHER OR NOT THEY CAN ESCALATE THAT 
15 INTO AN ARREST. 
16 MR. ALLEN: THAT MAY BE ACCURATE, YOUR HONOR, BUT THEY 
17 NEVER TOLD HIM THEY WANTED TO FRISK HIM FOR WEAPONS. THEY 
18 NEVER TOLD HIM THEY WERE EXERCISING A TERRY FRISK ON HIM. 
19 THEY'RE JUST GABBING WITH HIM. AND HE TURNS AROUND AND SAYS, 
20 I'M DONE, I'M WALKING AWAY. AND THEY INDICATE THAT HE'S 
21 WALKING AWAY. AND THEY INDICATE THAT HE'S GAINING GROUND AND 
22 WALKING AWAY FROM THEM. AND THEN OFFICER BOOTS, I GUESS IS 
23 ONE THAT DID IT, HE DETERMINES HE'S GONNA GRAB HIS ARM, 
24 ARREST HIM AND TAKE HIM TO THE GROUND, BUT HE DOESN'T SAY 
25 THAT. HE JUST TURNS IT INTO AN INSTANTANEOUS ARREST WITHOUT 
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EVER TELLING HIM HE'S UNDER ARREST, WITHOUT EVER PUTTING HIM 
UNDER ARREST, WITHOUT EVER GIVING ANY REASON WHY, AND 
FRANKLY, NEVER DID — NEVER DID DO WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE DONE 
FOR A TERRY FRISK. IT'S ONE THING TO SAY, I'M CONCERNED THAT 
YOU MAY HAVE A WEAPON. I'M GOING TO SEARCH YOU TO SEE IF 
THAT'S TRUE. THEY NEVER DO THAT. HE'S JUST TALKING. AND HE 
TELLS — HE KNOWS HE HAS NO REASON TO HOLD HIM OR STOP HIM. 
HE SAYS, WOULD YOU MIND, AS HE'S SAID ON THE STAND. AND THE 
FACT THAT HE DOESN'T IMMEDIATELY COMPLY WITH A, WOULD YOU 
MIND, GIVES HIM NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO DO ANYTHING ELSE. NONE. 
AND SO THE INITIAL STOP WE THINK IS VERY, VERY VAGUE AND 
BOGUS. EVEN THE FACT THAT THEY'RE TALK — THAT THEY WENT TO 
TALK TO HIM IN THE FIRST PLACE. AND WE BELIEVE THAT THAT'S 
WHY OFFICER BOOTS NOW IS SAYING, OH, WELL, WE HEARD THIS LOUD 
BANG AND WE — WE -- FIRST WE HEARD OF THAT WAS IN 
NATHAN'S — NATHAN'S REBUTTAL AFFIDAVIT AND MEMORANDUM. 
NOTHING IN THE REPORT ABOUT ANY OF THAT. WELL, CLEARLY, IF 
THAT HAPPENED, THAT IS NOT JUST SOMETHING THAT YOU MIGHT PUT 
INTO A REPORT. IT'S THE REASON THAT YOU ARE TALKING TO THIS 
GUY. AND IF THIS HAPPENED, THEY'D HAVE REPORTED IT. AND 
NEITHER OFFICER ROSE ANY INDICATION OF IT. 
SECONDLY, WHEN THEY DO MAKE CONTACT WITH HIM FOR 
WHATEVER REASON, AGAIN, THEY HAVE NO PROBABLE CAUSE, NO 
REASONABLE SUSPICION THERE'S ANYTHING WRONG UNTIL THEY 
APPROACH HIM. THEN THEY APPROACH HIM. IF THEY DETERMINE 
1 THAT HE'S PUBLIC INTOXICATED OR CAUSING A DISTURBANCE OR 
2 DOING SOME OF THOSE THINGS, THEIR ARREST MAY BE WRONG, BUT 
3 THEY HAVE THE RIGHT, I GUESS, TO SAY YOU'RE UNDER ARREST, AND 
4 THEN SEE IF HE COMPLIES WITH THE ARREST. THEY DIDN'T DO 
5 THAT. NEVER — NOT ONE WORD ABOUT THAT IN EITHER REPORT. 
6 AND THEY PULL HIM IN, PULL OPEN HIS HAND, AND ALLEGEDLY FIND 
7 THE CONTRABAND THAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED IN THIS 
8 CASE. AND I THINK YOU'RE RIGHT, THE CASES ARE CLEAR ABOUT 
9 THAT, THAT YOU DON'T HAVE THE RIGHT TO DO THAT UNLESS IT'S A 
10 FULL ARREST, AND THEY NEVER INVOKED THAT. 
11 THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE, MR. LYON? REGARDLESS OF WHAT 
12 YOU SAY, MR. ALLEN HAS ONE MORE SAY, SO IF THERE'S ANYTHING 
13 ELSE YOU'D LIKE TO ~ 
14 MR. LYON: OKAY. 
15 MR. ALLEN: DON'T HAVE TO. 
16 MR. LYON: YOUR HONOR, I'M A LITTLE BIT TROUBLED. WHAT 
17 IT REALLY COMES DOWN TO IS MR. ALLEN'S CALLING MR. BOOTS A 
18 LIAR. HE'S SAYING BECAUSE IT'S — BECAUSE THIS BANGING UP 
19 AGAINST THE CARS IS NOT INSIDE THE REPORT THAT IT DIDN'T 
20 HAPPEN. AND OFFICER BOOTS TESTIFIED THAT HE WRITES HIS 
21 REPORTS SO HE CAN REMEMBER WHAT — TO REFRESH HIS 
22 RECOLLECTION. 
23 THE COURT: BUT WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO YOU AND THE 
24 OFFICER, PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION OUGHT NOT TO 
25 BE LEFT OUT OF A REPORT. 
33 
MR. LYON: I'M NOT — I WILL NOT ARGUE — 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND THE OFFICER'S SAYING — I'M NOT 
CALLING HIM A LIAR, BUT PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE 
SUSPICION OUGHT NOT EVER TO BE LEFT OUT OF A REPORT BECAUSE 
MR. ALLEN'S POINT IS WELL TAKEN. WHAT DREW THIS PERSON TO 
THE OFFICER'S ATTENTION IS CRITICAL. THAT'S WHY WE'RE HERE. 
SO I UNDERSTAND YOU CAN'T PUT EVERYTHING IN A POLICE REPORT, 
BUT I REALLY SUSPECT HIS FIELD TRAINING OFFICER WOULD NOT 
APPROVE A REPORT THAT WAS WRITTEN WITHOUT THE REASONABLE 
SUSPICION AND THE PROBABLE CAUSE. AND AGAIN, I'M NOT 
QUESTIONING HIS CHARACTER OR CALLING HIM A LIAR OR ANYTHING 
ELSE, BUT IT SANDBAGS THE DEFENSE BECAUSE THEY SAY, OH, 
THERE'S NO PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE REPORT, AND THEN THE OFFICER 
COMES IN AND THEY HEAR ABOUT IT FOR THE VERY FIRST TIME AT 
THE HEARING. THAT'S TROUBLESOME UNDER ANY — ANY 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
MR. LYON: I WILL CERTAINLY AGREE WITH THAT, WITH YOUR 
HONOR, THAT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PUT IN THE REPORT, BUT I 
THINK TO HOLD IT AGAINST HIM SIMPLY BECAUSE HE FORGOT TO PUT 
IT IN I THINK IS UNREASONABLE. 
AND I GUESS, YOUR HONOR, WHAT — AND AGAIN, THIS IS — I 
THINK IT'S A TOUGH SITUATION BECAUSE, AS OFFICER BOOTS 
TESTIFIED, IT ALL HAPPENED SO QUICKLY AND IT'S HARD TO SAY 
MAGIC WORDS OR WHATEVER WHEN — WHEN THEY ARE FEARFUL OF 
THEIR LIFE AND ~ BUT, YOUR HONOR, WHAT — WHAT HAPPENS IS 
39 
1 THEY'VE GOT THIS INDIVIDUAL THAT'S FUMBLING WITH SOMETHING IN 
2 HIS POCKET THE WHOLE TIME. THEY WANNA SEE WHAT IT IS. AND 
3 IT'S ONLY WHEN THEY TAKE HIS HAND BACK AROUND THAT THEY 
4 DISCOVER IT, THAT THEY SEE IT IN HIS HAND AT THAT TIME. IT'S 
5 NOT FROM A FULL-BLOWN SEARCH OF HIS PERSON. IT'S WHEN THEY 
6 BRING HIS HAND AROUND FOR THEIR OFFICER SAFETY TO PUT IN 
7 HANDCUFFS THAT THEY SEE THE COCAINE OR WHATEVER THIS IS 
8 THAT'S — THAT'S INSIDE HIS HAND. 
9 THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. MR. ALLEN, ANYTHING YOU 
10 WANNA RESPOND TO THAT? 
11 MR. ALLEN: JUST THE ONE THING, AND I FEEL BAD FOR 
12 NATHAN BECAUSE HE'S STUCK WITH THIS SITUATION, BUT THEY WANT 
13 IT BOTH WAYS HERE, JUDGE. THEY WANNA ACT LIKE IT HAPPENED SO 
14 FAST, YET THEY ALSO WANNA SAY, I STOOD THERE AND TALKED TO 
15 HIM FOR A LONG TIME AND IT DIDN'T HAPPEN FAST. WELL, THAT'S 
16 NOT — YOU CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. YOU EITHER HAD TIME TO 
17 SAY ALL THE THINGS YOU SAID YOU COULD, WHICH CLEARLY COULD 
18 HAVE SAID, WELL, YOU'RE UNDER ARREST FOR PUBLIC INTOXICATION, 
19 OR THEY DIDN'T. AND THEY CAN'T SAY WE DID FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
20 TRYING TO MANUFACTURE, IN OUR OPINION, PROBABLE — REASONABLE 
21 SUSPICION, BUT WE DIDN'T WHEN IT CAME TIME TO TELL HIM HE WAS 
22 UNDER ARREST. THAT'S — IT'S BALONEY. 
23 THE COURT: MR. ALLEN, I NEED A LITTLE MORE TIME. I'VE 
24 GOT TWO MORE CASES I GOTTA READ. THE LAW CLERKS PULLED 'EM. 
25 WHEN MR. LYON GOT BACK FROM HIS TOUR LAST WEEK, HE HAND 
DELIVERED HIS BRIEF, BUT I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO READ ALL 
OF THE CASES IN HIS BRIEF. NEXT WEEK IS CITY. I 'M GONNA 
TAKE IT UNDER ADVISEMENT UNTIL NEXT WEDNESDAY. I GOT TWO 
MORE CASES I GOTTA READ ON THIS MATTER. 
YOU'VE ANSWERED MY QUESTIONS. I ' L L TAKE IT UNDER 
ADVISEMENT. WE'LL SEE YOU BACK ON NEXT WEDNESDAY. 
MR. LYON: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
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MR. ALLEN: COULD ~ DO YOU WANNA CALL NUMBER 28, YOUR 
HONOR, IF WE'RE READY ON MR. HENDERSON? 
THE COURT: WHAT NUMBER IS HE? 
THE CLERK: 28. 
MR. ALLEN: NUMBER 28. 
THE CLERK: IS MR. BUSHELL (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
MR. BUSHELL: I AM. 
THE CLERK: SORRY, I COULDN'T SEE — 
MR. ALLEN: HE'S SKULKING OVER HERE BEHIND THE PODIUM. 
THE COURT: MR. ALLEN, I AGREE WITH THE DEFENSE'S 
ANALYSIS ON THIS PARTICULAR SITUATION. I THINK THEY HAD 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO MAKE A TERRY STOP, BUT I THINK THEY 
WENT BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THEIR ABILITY TO SIMPLY TO CHECK FOR 
WEAPONS. AND THERE WERE AN ARSENAL OF OTHER REASONS THAT 
THEY COULD HAVE AT ANY POINT PUT MR. HENDERSON UNDER ARREST. 
AND THOSE WORDS ARE MAGICAL, AND IT CHANGES THE STATUS OF A 
PARTICULAR DEFENDANT IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. AND I'M 
GRANTING THE DEFENSE'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE. 
YOU'LL PREPARE FINDINGS OF FACTS — 
MR. ALLEN: I WILL, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: — SUPPORTING THAT DECISION. AND LIKE I 
SAY, MY EMPHASIS IS NOT NECESSARILY — I THINK THERE WAS 
ENOUGH INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE FOR THEM TO MAKE A TERRY FRISK 
AND STOP, BUT AT THAT POINT, THEY WENT IMMEDIATELY INTO 
1 ARREST MODE WITHOUT EVER HAVING PROBABLE CAUSE TO MAKE THE 
2 ARREST, AND WENT WELL BEYOND ANY SCOPE THAT THEY HAD TO CHECK 
3 HIM FOR WEAPONS. AND THE NEXT THING, WITHOUT SAYING THE 
4 MAGIC WORDS, THEY'VE GOT HIM UNDER ARREST AND CHARGED WITH 
5 THINGS. AND SO I'M GRANTING THE MOTION. 
6 MR. ALLEN: OKAY. 
7 THE CLERK: DOES THAT NEED TO BE ON COURT REPORTER — 
8 COURT REPORTER? 
9 MR. BUSHELL: THIS IS A FIRST DEGREE FELONY. I THINK 
10 THAT HE'S NOT HERE — 
11 THE COURT: NO, WE WAIVED HIS APPEARANCE — 
12 MR. ALLEN: YEAH, WE WAIVED HIS, AND I'M ASSUMING OUR — 
13 THE COURT: YEAH. 
14 MR. ALLEN: — VIDEO WOULD DO THIS. NOW, ONE QUESTION I 
15 HAVE IS WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE — WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS A 
16 RATHER GROSS DISPARITY BETWEEN WHAT THE TWO OFFICERS WROTE IN 
17 THEIR POLICE REPORT AND WHAT THEY THEN TESTIFIED TO AT THIS 
18 HEARING. HOW DO I HANDLE THAT, YOUR HONOR? I THINK THAT'S 
19 AN ISSUE. IT SHOULD BE RESERVED. IF THE — THE WAY THINGS 
20 ARE GOING, STATE SOMETIMES APPEALS THESE THINGS. 
21 THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, THE DIFFICULTY IS, I DON'T HAVE 
22 TO REACH THAT ISSUE TO RESOLVE IT. I SIMPLY DON'T THINK I 
23 HAVE TO REACH THAT ISSUE TO RESOLVE IT. YOU'VE BEEN ASSUMING 
24 WHAT EITHER OFFICER SAID TO BE THE TRUTH. I THINK THEY — 
25 THEY HAVE — THEY CAN MAKE A TERRY STOP AND FRISK, BUT AT 
4 
THAT POINT, THEY GO WELL BEYOND ANY SCOPE TO CHECK FOR 
WEAPONS OR FOR THEIR OWN PROTECTION. AND THEY END UP IN A 
FULL-FLEDGED ARREST WITHOUT EVER TELLING HIM THAT HE WAS 
ARRESTED. I GUESS IMPLICITY, IT MEANS THAT, YOU KNOW, I 
DIDN'T FIND ANY CREDIBILITY IN THOSE PARTICULAR SITUATIONS. 
MR. ALLEN: OKAY. 
THE COURT: I DON'T THINK I CAN RESOLVE THE SITUATION 
WHERE THERE WAS NO MENTION IN THE POLICE REPORT ABOUT THE 
INTOXICATION AND THE GLASSY EYES AND THE BANG WITH THE 
GARBAGE AND ALL THOSE OTHER THINGS. THAT CAME OUT ON THE 
STAND. THE OFFICER EXPLAINED WHY HE DIDN'T PUT THAT IN HIS 
REPORT. I WOULD CONCEDE THERE IS A DISPARITY BETWEEN HIS 
TESTIMONY AND WHAT HE PUT IN HIS REPORT, BUT HIS EXPLANATION 
MAY COVER THAT, THAT HE DOESN'T PUT EVERYTHING IN HIS REPORT 
BUT I'M ALSO ON THE RECORD AT THE TIME OF THE MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS TO TELL HIM THAT PROBABLE CAUSE IS ESSENTIAL, AND 
THAT'S NOT SOMETHING THAT YOU LEAVE OUT OF YOUR REPORT. 
MR. ALLEN: OKAY. GOT IT. AND THEN, MS. NEIDER, AFTER 
THEY'VE PREPARED THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, I 
GUESS MR. LYON WILL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT HE HAS ANY 
KIND OF CASE AT ALL IF THE EVIDENCE IS SUPPRESSED. I DOUBT 
IT GIVEN THE TENOR OF THE TESTIMONY, BUT THE STATE STILL HAS 
A RIGHT TO EITHER APPEAL — 
MS. NEIDER: THE DEFENDANT IS DOWN AT THE PRISON; IS 
THAT RIGHT? 
5 
THE COURT: RIGHT, THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. ALLEN: HE IS. AND THAT'S ALWAYS (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
MS. NEIDER: DO YOU WANNA GIVE HIM A TIME TO REPORT ON 
THAT, JUDGE? 
THE COURT: WELL, I FIGURED HE MAY EVEN APPEAL, SO I WAS 
GONNA WAIT UNTIL MR. ALLEN PREPARED HIS FINDINGS OF FACTS, 
AND THEN YOU HAVE 30 DAYS FROM THEN TO DECIDE WHETHER TO 
APPEAL OR NOT, SO — 
MR. ALLEN: YEAH, WE'LL DO IT RIGHT AWAY. 
THE COURT: — UNTIL MR. ALLEN ~ ONCE MR. ALLEN GETS 
THAT DONE, THEN YOU'LL HAVE 30 DAYS TO DECIDE. IF HE DECIDES 
TO APPEAL, THEN WE'LL WAIT AND SEE HOW THE APPEAL GO. IF HE 
DOESN'T, THEN THE 30 DAYS, WE'RE DONE. HE'LL HAVE TO DECIDE 
WHETHER HE'S GONNA BE ABLE TO PROSECUTE AT THAT POINT. 
MR. BUSHELL: JUDGE, I'LL BE PREPARING THOSE. 
MR. ALLEN: BASED ON WHAT MR. LYON TOLD ME AT THE 
HEARING, I DON'T THINK HE'LL APPEAL IT, BUT THERE IS THAT 
POSSIBILITY. 
THE COURT 
MR. ALLEN 
THE CLERK 
THE COURT 
THE CLERK 
THE COURT 
OKAY. ALL RIGHT. 
THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
PROBABLY RIGHT FOR OUR PURPOSES, 
GO LIKE TWO MONTHS THEN? 
YEAH, GO TO APRIL 26TH. 
MS. NEIDER: THANKS, JUDGE. 
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OGDEN, UTAH MARCH 22, 2006 
THE COURT: DID MR. ALLEN LEAVE? MR. ALLEN, WILL YOU 
COME BACK UP? 
MR. LYON'S FILED A MOTION. HE WANTED CLARIFICATION ON 
THE MICHAEL DAMON HENDERSON. DID YOU GET A COPY OF THIS? 
I'M PREPARED TO (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
MR. LYON: BERNIE, I SENT THAT OVER TO RYAN BECAUSE I 
THOUGHT HE'S HANDLING THE CASE. 
THE CLERK: JUDGE, WE NEED TO RECALL (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
THE COURT: OKAY. WE'LL COME BACK TO IT. 
THIS IS STATE OF UTAH VERSUS MICHAEL HENDERSON. I'M 
PREPARED. I WENT BACK AND LISTENED TO IT. I DID SAY THAT 
THE POLICE PROBABLY DID HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO MAKE AN ARREST 
ON THE FIRST RULING. BUT THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER OR NOT THE 
POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO DETAIN MR. HENDERSON IN THE 
FIRST TIME. AND MY RULING ON THE SECOND ONE WAS THEY WENT 
OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF WHAT I THOUGHT THEY HAD THE AUTHORITY IT 
TO DETAIN HIM FOR — 
MR. ALLEN: RIGHT. 
THE COURT: — AND THEREFORE, THEY DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE 
CAUSE — 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
ALLEN: 
COURT: 
ALLEN: 
COURT: 
TO ARREST HIM. 
— TO DETAIN HIM IN THE FIRST PLACE — 
RIGHT. 
— AND SO I SUPPRESSED THE EVIDENCE BASED 
3 
1 UPON THAT INITIAL THING. 
2 NOW, ONCE THE POLICE ARE WITH HIM, AND THEY GOT INTO 
3 THE — THE PHYSICAL ALTERCATION AND THE ALLEGED REFUSAL AND 
4 EVERYTHING ELSE, I DID FEEL THE POLICE COULD HAVE PUT HIM 
5 UNDER ARREST, BUT I DON'T HAVE TO GET TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER 
6 OR NOT THEY HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST HIM BECAUSE I FELT 
7 THEY WENT OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE THEIR REASONABLE SUSPICION 
8 TO DETAIN HIM AND STOP HIM IN THE FIRST PLACE. SO WHILE — 
9 YOU KNOW, ONCE THE POLICE DETAIN SOMEBODY AND THEN SOMEONE 
10 GETS PHYSICAL WITH THEM, THERE MAY VERY WELL HAVE BEEN 
11 PROBABLE CALLS TO ARREST. DON'T HAVE TO GET THERE. THEY 
12 DIDN'T HAVE — THEY WENT BEYOND THEIR SCOPE IN DETAINING HIM 
13 ON A TERRY STOP IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND THERE WAS NO 
14 REASONABLE SUSPICION OR PROBABLE CAUSE TO DETAIN HIM IN THE 
15 FIRST PLACE. SO THERE WAS INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS, BUT I 
16 DON'T HAVE TO GET TO THE ISSUE OF PROBABLE CALLS FOR THE 
17 ARREST. 
18 MR. ALLEN: OKAY. 
19 MR. LYON: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) I GUESS SO I'M 
20 UNDERSTANDING, YOU'RE NOT — YOU'RE NOT GOING TO RULE 
21 SPECIFICALLY ON THE ISSUE OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
22 (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
23 THE COURT: NO, I DID MAKE — I DID MAKE THE COMMENT 
24 THAT IF THE OFFICERS WOULD HAVE AT ANY TIME PLACED HIM UNDER 
25 ARREST, IT MAY HAVE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT THEY WENT 
4 
OUTSIDE THEIR SCOPE IN DETAINING HIM IN THE FIRST PLACE. ON 
A TERRY STOP AND FRISK, THEY HAD NO — THEY HAD NO BELIEF — 
NO REASON TO BEGIN TO PURSUING (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
MR. LYON: BUT THAT THEY DID HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TO MAKE A TERRY STOP. 
THE COURT: THEY COULD HAVE STOPPED HIM, BUT THEN THEY 
WENT BEYOND THE SCOPE, WAS MY RULING. MR. ALLEN — 
MR. LYON: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: — DISAGREES WITH THAT, BUT THEY WENT BEYOND 
THE SCOPE. THEY GET TO PAT HIM DOWN FOR WEAPONS. THEY DON'T 
GET TO GRAB HIM, THEY DON'T GET TO MAKE HIM STAY THERE, THEY 
DON'T GET TO MAKE HIM DO ALL KINDS OF THINGS. THEY SIMPLY 
SHOULD HAVE PATTED HIM DOWN AND EITHER SENT HIM ON HIS WAY OR 
NOT. THEY DID NOT DO THAT. MY RULING WAS THEY WENT BEYOND 
THE SCOPE OF THEIR PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION. 
MR. LYON: OKAY. 
THE COURT: MR. ALLEN, YOU'RE STILL DOING THE PAPERWORK, 
RIGHT? I HAVEN'T SIGNED IT YET. ALL RIGHT. 
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